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Introduction
The basic objective of this paper is to assess India’s acquisition of
nuclear weapons in light of the general debate why states ‘go nuclear’
and build nuclear arsenals. In general, analysts proffer four arguments
about proliferation of nuclear weapons. They are: (1) security
concerns; (2) prestige; (3) technological imperatives; and (4) domestic
politics.1 The first posits that security concerns directly related to a
state’s physical security and survival might drive a state to acquire
nuclear weapons. A state, when operating in an environment of
anarchy and acute security dilemmas, remains very concerned with
national security and survival. Depending on the intensity of security
dilemmas, states often resort to developing lethal military forces,
including, in some instances, nuclear weapons. For example, the ‘first
generation’ nuclear powers (the USA, the USSR, the UK, France and
1 For a general discussion on the causes of nuclear weapons proliferation, see
Lewis A. Dunn and William H. Overholt, ‘The Next Phase in Nuclear Proliferation
Research,’ Orbis, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Summer 1976), pp. 497–524; William Epstein,
‘Why States Go—And Don’t Go—Nuclear,’ The Annals of The American Academy of
Political and Social Science, Vol. 430 (March 1977), pp. 16–28; Lewis A. Dunn,
Controlling the Bomb (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); William H. Kincade
and Christoph Bertram ed. Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s: Perspectives and Proposals
(London: McMillan, 1982); Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Bradley A. Thayer, ‘The Causes of
Nuclear Proliferation and theUtility of theNuclearNonproliferationRegime,’Security
Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 463–519; Tanya Ogilvie-White, ‘Is There
a Nuclear Proliferation Debate? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate,’ The
Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Fall 1996), pp. 43–60; Scott D. Sagan, ‘Why
Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,’ International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996–97), pp. 54–86; Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Causes
of Nuclear Proliferation,’ Current History, Vol. 96, No. 609 (April 1997), pp. 151–
6; Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The Conceptual Debate,’




China) and the ‘second generation’ nuclear states (India, Pakistan
etc.) acquired nuclear weapons because they each faced an acute
security threat from a strategic adversary.
The second argument holds that nuclear weapons act as a symbol
of prestige for a nation, which tempts a state to build a nuclear
arsenal. Building of nuclear weapons, according to this view, bestows
great power status or international recognition upon a state. Such
status may result from the military power nuclear weapons inherently
add, from scientific and industrial strength associated with nuclear
forces and from the increased great power attention that nuclear
or ‘threshold’ nuclear states may receive. Britain, France and India
are often cited as examples where prestige was an important factor
behind their decisions to acquire nuclear weapons. Thirdly, a state’s
decision to acquire nuclearweapons is an inevitable outcomeof techno-
logical momentum created by nuclear research and development
programmes. A fourth argument holds that intra-bureaucratic politics
as well as politicians’ drive to score domestic political points may lead
a state to the nuclear path. According to this perspective, bureau-
crats acting on the basis of their own individual policy preferences
or bureaucracies carrying out their specific institutional interests
attempt to influence states’ decisions to acquire nuclear weapons.
Homi Bhabha in the case of India, and Pierre Guillaumat and Pierre
Taranger in the case of France are often cited as examples of bureau-
crats who had played pivotal roles in the proliferation decision of their
particular countries. This argument also holds that politicians at times
may decide to go nuclear in order to gain domestic popularity.
This paper argues that various factors influenced India’s pursuit
of a nuclear development programme, although ultimately it was
concern for national security that played the critical role in turning it
to a military oriented project. In particular, this article advances the
argument that India’s choice to pursue a nuclear weapons strategy
primarily relates to its perception that its security as a state was
best preserved by doing so in a strategic environment dominated
by an intractable security dilemma involving itself, China, and,
increasingly after 1974, Pakistan. The argument is developed through
a focussed historical narrative to explain India’s policy perceptions
and motivations. This method illustrates the changing contour of
India’s nuclear policy and postures and analyses the factors that led
it down the road to Pokhran I and II. As will be observed, the origin
of a national nuclear trajectory in India lay in the formation of a
nuclear security dilemma precipitated by the first Chinese nuclear
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test in October 1964. With the modernisation of the Chinese nuclear
force, India tentatively contemplated a military nuclear programme,
which gradually took a decisive shape in the vortex of an intensifying
tripartite nuclear security dilemma in the South Asia region. Of
course, India pursued it in a clandestine manner, before advancing
an overt nuclear posture in May 1998.
Three distinct phases can be observed in India’s nuclear develop-
ment programme from 1947 to 1998. From 1947–1964, India prim-
arily emphasised the building of a wide-ranging civilian nuclear
infrastructure, although it yet had a built-in advantage of defence use
and Indian leaders were aware of this fact. Indian leaders conceived
such a nuclear programme in terms of economic development,
industrial self-sufficiency and well-being of the population. There
was no real indication of military implications of the nuclear pro-
gramme during this period. From 1964–1974, Indians thoroughly
debated their own country’s nuclear identity, precipitated by the first
Chinese nuclear test in October 1964. New Delhi officially adopted
a ‘nuclear option’ policy by refusing to sign the NPT in 1968. This
posture produced a ‘peaceful nuclear explosion’ (PNE) in 1974.
From 1974–1998, India pursued a policy of ‘nuclear ambiguity’—
neither confirming nor denying the pursuance of a nuclear weapons
programme or existence of nuclear weapons—before conducting five
nuclear tests in May 1998. Simultaneously, however, India streng-
thened and expanded its nuclear deterrent capabilities during this
period as a hedge against the Chinese and growing Pakistani nuclear
capabilities.
Phase I: 1947–1964
Politics of Nuclear Infrastructure Building
Origins of India’s Nuclear Programme
The origins of India’s nuclear programme precede its independence.
It started in 1944 with the establishment of the Tata Institute of
Fundamental Research (TIFR) and subsequently with the creation of
the Atomic Energy Research Committee (AERC) in 1946.
Following independence, the enactment of the Atomic Energy
Act (AEA) in August 1948 paved the way for creating the Indian
Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) in place of the AERC, which
expedited the process of building an Indian nuclear infrastructure.
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TheAEAplaced all uraniumand thoriumreserves in the country under
state control and facilitated the conduct of all nuclear research and
development activities in ‘secret.’2 The Indian Government created
the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) in 1954 to further stimulate
nuclear research and atomic energy development. Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru and Homi Bhabha, Chairman of the IAEC, became
its firstminister and secretary respectively, whichunderscored that the
Indian Government was determined to build the nuclear programme
on a priority basis. In addition, the Atomic Energy Establishment,
Trombay (AEET, renamed as Bhabha Atomic Research Centre or
BARC in 1967) was established in 1954 in order to expedite the
building of a nuclear infrastructure. Its primary objectives were to
create skilled manpower and basic infrastructure in order to facilitate
nuclear R&D and transfer of nuclear technology.3
Sustained efforts produced results quite quickly. The endogenously
built one-megawatt thermal (MWt) swimming pool type research
reactor—the Aspara (‘Water Nymph’)—went critical on 4 August
1956. For India, this breakthrough was important; because it sub-
stantially contributed to the subsequent development of its nuclear
programme.
India in the initial phase utilised a favourable international environ-
ment for atomic research and development to build its nuclear
programme. In the 1950s, the general view about atomic R&D was
that peaceful use of the atom could solve many of the economic and
social problems of humankind.4 Given such a favourable international
2 It is noteworthy that the Chairman of the IAEC had the power to formulate and
implement policies with regard to country’s nuclear programme in ‘total secrecy’ and
was responsible only to the Prime Minister. This power of the IAEC Chairman was
enhanced by the reconstitution of the Commission in 1958 and the enactment of the
Atomic Energy Act, 1962. It was a clear indication of ambiguity in India’s nuclear
activities. There was considerable disagreement between Prime Minister Nehru and
prominent nuclear scientist Professor Meghnad Saha on nuclear planning and the
operation of the IAEC. This disagreement was reflected in the letters exchanged
between them during the initial phase of India’s nuclear infrastructure building.
This author read these hand-written letters in April 1999 that were preserved in
the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi. Also on this point, see
Dhirendra Sharma, India’s Nuclear Estate (New Delhi: Lancers Publishers, 1983),
pp. 149–50. Criticisms of the lack of accountability in India’s nuclear programme
can also be found in Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb (New Delhi:
Orient Longman Limited, 1999).
3 K.D. Kapur, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Diplomacy (New Delhi: Lancer, 1993),
p. 226.
4 For example, the US ‘Atom for Peace’ initiative is a case in this context.
President Dwight Eisenhower in 1953 viewed that if applied peacefully, atoms could
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circumstance and utilising commercial interests of the industrialised
countries, India garnered considerable assistance from France, the
United Kingdom, Canada and the United States to build its nuclear
programme. In particular, Canadian assistance in the initial phase
contributed substantially to India’s nuclear efforts.5
By the early 1960s, India, by vigorous indigenous efforts and with
considerable foreign assistance, made substantial progress in building
a formidable nuclear infrastructure. More importantly, it had estab-
lished a technological base, which could allow India to begin a nuclear
weapons programme or at least a nuclear explosives project if the
need arose. As it turned out to be the case, India indeed launched a
nuclear explosion project in November 1965, in the aftermath of the
first Chinese nuclear test.
Rise of China Factor, 1962 Sino-Indian Border War
In 1958, China for the first time publicly indicated that it would
develop nuclear weapons.6 The Chinese announcement came out at
a time when the Sino-Indian relation was gradually deteriorating,
eclipsing the spirit of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai (Indians and Chinese
are brothers). It immediately made an impact on some quarters of
the Indian political circles. An indication of this can be found in two
Lok Sabha (Lower House of Indian Parliament) motions introduced
for discussion on 10 March 1959, which suggested enlarging India’s
nuclear research ‘to the field of defence.’ During the discussion, Prime
Minister Nehru downplayed the Chinese nuclear threat and asserted
that India was ahead of China in nuclear R&D.7
Notwithstanding Nehru’s unconcerned public posture, the Indian
Government was actually aware of the Chinese decision’s implications
for India’s national security. Its concern was mirrored in a statement
made by the Indian permanent representative to the United Nations
be ‘developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind.’ See, USDepartment of
State, Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State
Publication, 1960), p. 399.
5 For a discussion on this, see David Hart, Nuclear Power in India: A Comparative
Analysis (London: Allen and Unwin, 1983).
6 For a historical background of the Chinese nuclear programme, see John Wilson
Lewis andXue Litai,China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
1988), especially pp. 35–72.
7 G.G. Mirchandani, India’s Nuclear Dilemma (New Delhi: Popular Book Services,
1968), p. 13.
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in August 1959. The representative revealed that ‘the Government of
India has noted with concern that the number of countries possessing
nuclear weapons may soon be increased and thus considerably add
to the current dangerous possibilities.’8 Nehru himself stated in the
Indian Parliament on 22 November 1960 that ‘If nothing effective
is done in regard to disarmament in the course of the next three
or four years, it may perhaps become too late to deal with it; it may
become almost impossible to control the situation.’9 Nehru’s reference
was certainly China and he proved right when China tested a nuclear
weapon in1964.However,NewDelhi chose to pursuenuclear disarma-
ment to address the problem.
In October 1962, China and India fought a brief but intense border
war.10 The war left far-reaching consequences on India’s strategic
psyche. It not only exposed India’s defence vulnerabilities, it also
invalidated Nehru’s assumptions that a communist land power would
not engage India militarily and security could be achieved through
the posture of peaceful coexistence. Two changes occurred in India’s
defence planning in the aftermath of the war: (1) the nature of
threat to India was appreciated more ‘realistically’ with the growing
perception that China posed a long-term danger; and (2) deterrence
and defence became important in India’s defence planning and an
integral element in India’s diplomacy.11
The 1962 Sino-Indian border war, however, did not cause an abrupt
change in India’s nuclear policy. India’s defence preparation in the
aftermath of the war relative to China remained at the conventional
level and the Indian military planned for, at most, another limited
conflict in order to deny 50,000 sq. miles of disputed territory claimed
by Beijing and defending India’s geo-strategic interests in Nepal,
Sikkim and Bhutan.12 Two factors influenced India to advance such a
defence posture. Firstly, it employed international diplomacy as the
primary means to restrain China from acquiring a nuclear weapons
8 Ibid.
9 Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946 –
April 1961 (New Delhi: The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961), p. 235.
10 On the Sino-IndianBorderWar, see JohnW.Garver,Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian
Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University ofWashington Press, 2001); Neville
Maxwell, India’s China War (Bombay: Jaico Publishing House, 1970).
11 Ashok Kapur, ‘Peace and Power in India’s Nuclear Policy,’ Asian Survey, Vol. X,
No. 9 (September 1970), pp. 784–5
12 Lorne J. Kavic, India’s Quest for Security: Defense Policies, 1947–1965 (Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1967), p. 214.
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capability. And secondly, India did not want to engage in a nuclear
arms race with China due to its fear that it would ruin the Indian
economy.
Yet, the war brought the Chinese nuclear threat to the limelight
and stimulated debate over India’s own nuclear identity. In reaction
to the border clash, the right-wing Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Jana
Sangh demanded the production of nuclear weapons by India as part of
India’s long-term defence efforts against China.13 Subsequently Jana
Sangh raised the same demand in the Lok Sabha arguing that ‘only
those who wish to see Russians or Chinese ruling India will oppose
the development of nuclear weapons.’14 Despite such demands from
opposition political parties, the IndianGovernment still remained firm
not to embark on a military nuclear programme.
From 1947–1964, India primarily focussed on developing a wide-
ranging civilian nuclear infrastructure with an apparent intent of
using atomic energy for industrial and economic purposes. And there
was no overt indication of any military implications of India’s nuclear
programme during this period except that New Delhi did not act
in such a way that would permanently foreclose its military nuclear
option. However, Indian elites were well aware that their country’s
nuclear energy programme contained ‘a built-in advantage of defence
use if the need should arise.’15
Phase II: 1964–1974
Politics of ‘Nuclear Option’
This was a period of soul-searching of India’s nuclear policy
precipitated by the first Chinese nuclear test on 16 October 1964.
Against the backdrop of the still sore wound of 1962 defeat, the
Chinese test set off an unprecedented nuclear debate in India. This
debate primarily focussed on what measures India could take to
13 G.G. Mirchandani, ‘India and Nuclear Weapons,’ in Perspectives of India’s Nuclear
Policy, ed. T.T. Poulose (New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1978), pp. 55–6.
14 Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 15, 3rd Series (23March 1963), col. 5780–5783.
15 This quote is adapted from a note of India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru (1947–1964), who wrote it in the margin of a memo from Homi Bhabha,
the first Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. Bhabha submitted the
memo to the Prime Minister detailing a nuclear agreement reached with Canada in
1964. See Ashok Kapur, India’s Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision-Making
(New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p. 194.
196 BHUMITRA CHAKMA
counter a perceived Chinese nuclear threat and what were the merits
and demerits of India developing its own nuclear arsenal. After a
decade of contemplation, India conducted a so-called ‘peaceful nuclear
explosion’ (PNE) in May 1974.
Chinese Nuclear Test: Reactions in India
On 29 September 1964, American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk,
revealed that the United States expected China would conduct a
nuclear test in the near future.16 This revelation sparked a nascent
nuclear debate in India. Inder Malhotra, for example, opined that the
Indian Government could not and should not pursue the Nehruvian
nuclear policy in the aftermath of the Chinese nuclear test. He argued
the ‘first fruits of the Chinese nuclear explosion will be psychological
and political rather than military.’ Prophetically he predicted: ‘The
pressure for rethinking on this policy is . . . bound to grow; it is likely to
emanate from the Opposition and from within the Congress Party.’17
Confirming Dean Rusk’s anticipation, China conducted its first
nuclear test on 16October 1964. Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur
Shastri immediately reacted by observing that the Chinese blast had
‘come to me and I think to the whole world as a shock and a danger
to the maintenance of peace.’18 However, he was reluctant to review
India’s peaceful nuclear policy. On a radio broadcast three days later,
Shastri indicated that India’s nuclear policy would remain unchanged
and India would not emulate the Chinese example of developing and
testing nuclear bombs.19
Notwithstanding Shastri’s ‘no policy change’ stance, various political
parties (including a majority of the All India Congress Committee
members), the Indian media, many influential public opinion-makers
and a majority of the Indian polity reacted sharply demanding the
manufacturing of nuclear weapons by India. Jana Sangh at a working
committee meeting on 4 December 1964 resolved that the party
16 ‘Statement by Secretary of StateRusk onChineseCommunistNuclear Program,’
29 September 1964, printed inUSArmsControl andDisarmamentAgency (hereafter
A.C.D.A.), Documents on Disarmament, 1964 (Washington, D.C.: US Government
Printing Office, 1965), p. 440.
17 Inder Malhotra, ‘India’s Response to Chinese Nuclear Threat,’ The Statesman,
9 October 1964.
18 The Hindustan Times, 17 October 1964.
19 The Hindustan Times, 20 December 1964.
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‘ . . . considers it imperative that an all out effort bemade to build up an
independent nuclear deterrent . . . and urges the government of India
to revise its stands accordingly.’20 The Praja Socialist Party (PSP) in a
similar fashion demanded immediatemanufacturing of Indian bombs.
PSP leaderNath Pai passionately argued in party’smouthpiece, Janata:
‘The explosion of China in defiance of the treaty at Moscow (Partial
Test BanTreaty), in defiance of world opinion, was not a freak, nor just
the blowing of a cracker by an erratic child, it was the culmination of a
certain process which she has laid down for herself. We have to think
of, judge and evaluate it against the background of the Chinese overall
strategy, long-termpolicy, long-term activities in the whole of Asia and
in the world.’21 A majority within the Congress Party also favoured
India’s building of a nuclear arsenal in the aftermath of the Chinese
nuclear test. At the All India Congress Committee (AICC) meeting
on 7 and 8 November 1964, the majority of the speakers came out
‘strongly and frankly’ in favour of India manufacturing atom bombs.22
The Indian media, with few exceptions, also favoured India’s manu-
facturing of nuclear weapons. An editorial in Pioneer on 19 October
1964 was typical in this context. It stressed that the Chinese test
posed a ‘new menace’ to India, a threat which India could counter
either by relying on a U.S. nuclear guarantee (which the editor argued
would prove unreliable and politically unacceptable) or by reversing
India’s anti-nuclear weapons posture.23 The Indian press also debated
the political implications of Chinese nuclear capability for India. The
Indian Express, in an editorial, commented that China’s ‘membership
into the nuclear club of five world powers gives her a status of which
the bomb is a symbol. . . .The question arises in purely psychological
terms—can India afford to sit still while the Chinese continue to score
an advantage over us.’24
The majority of the Indian public supported India’s acquisition
of nuclear weapons in the aftermath of the Chinese test. Gerard
Braunthal in a survey conducted amongst the general public in early
1966 found that 7 out of 10 believed India should produce its own
20 Shyam Bhatia, India’s Nuclear Bomb (Sahibabad: Vikas, 1979), p. 112.
21 Nath Pai, ‘A Dispassionate Assessment of the Chinese Atom Bomb,’ Janata (New
Delhi), 13 December 1964, p. 3.
22 ‘AICC and the Bomb,’ The Economic Weekly, 14 November 1964.
23 The Pioneer (Lucknow), 19 October 1964.
24 The Indian Express (Madras), 19 October 1964.
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atomic weapons.25 He further said: ‘Those who answered positively
argued that atomic weapons were needed for defense against China
and Pakistan to withstand any blackmail and to maintain a balance of
power, that national prestige would be enhanced, and that India no
longer would need to rely militarily on American and Russian nuclear
umbrella.’26
The Bomb Debate
The Chinese test triggered an unprecedented and sustained nuclear
debate in India.27 Four basic issues were debated by the Indians.
They were: (1) the morality of India possessing nuclear weapons;
(2) whether the Chinese nuclear test constituted an essentially
political or military threat to India; (3) the financial cost of an Indian
nuclear weapons programme and a Sino-Indian nuclear arms race;
and (4) whether Indian security was really assured by implied
Soviet andAmerican extended deterrence guarantees against Chinese
aggression.
Moral issues were important elements of the Indian debate about
acquiring nuclear weapons. Many thought building nuclear weapons
was contrary toGandhi’s teachings aswell as inconsistentwithNehru’s
international diplomacy of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear opponents
also argued that the ethical dimension of India’s foreign policy should
not be sacrificed which had, they felt, earned the country respect in the
eyes of the world community. Abstaining from nuclear weapons would
25 Gerard Braunthal, ‘An Attitude Survey in India,’ Public Opinion Quarterly,Vol. 33,
No. 1 (Spring 1969), p. 81.
26 Ibid.
27 For an overview of the debate, see Sisir Gupta, ‘The Indian Dilemma,’ in
A World of Nuclear Powers?, ed. Alastair Buchan (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall Inc., 1966), pp. 55–67. Few influential opinion-makers include, Raj Krishna,
‘India and the Bomb,’ India Quarterly, Vol. XXI, No. 2 (April–June 1965), pp. 119–37,
who advocated a nuclear deterrent against China, while pursuing arms control and
disarmament goals; R. K.Nehru, ‘TheChallenge of theChinese Bomb,’ IndiaQuarterly,
Vol. XXI, No. 1 (January–March 1965), pp. 3–14; andM. J. Desai, ‘India and Nuclear
Weapons,’ Disarmament and Arms Control, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Autumn 1965), pp. 135–42,
strongly opposed India going nuclear. Masani propagated a security arrangement
with the West as an alternative option. See, M.R. Masani, ‘The Challenge of the
Chinese Bomb,’ India Quarterly, Vol. XXI, No. 1 (January–March 1965), pp. 15–28.
For views of influential public opinion-makers, also see ‘India and the Chinese Bomb:
A Symposium,’ Gandhi Marg (New Delhi), Vol. 9, No. 1 (January 1965), pp. 4–12; and
‘India and the Bomb: A Symposium,’ Gandhi Marg, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January 1966),
pp. 11–18.
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help India to pursue the cause of nuclear disarmament. On the other
hand, India’s nuclear weapons advocates argued that it was unrealistic
to depend on onlymoral force for security when there were five nuclear
weapons states in the world. Security, they concluded, should take
precedence over morality. This group further argued that since India
wanted nuclear weapons to deter its adversaries, acquisition of nuclear
weapons could be reconciled with Gandhi’s teachings.28
A second central element of the debate was whether China’s nuclear
explosion represented a direct military threat to India. Opponents
of nuclear weapons argued that China’s explosion was primarily to
gain status and prestige and was directed more towards the United
States and the Soviet Union than India. Militarily, India’s acquisition
of nuclear weapons would be largely irrelevant to the world’s central
strategic balance. India should not overreact to China’s explosion;
rather it should try other means, such as nuclear disarmament, to
meet the challenge. Moreover, the existing Chinese military threat to
India was basically conventional, which India was countering through
defence review and reorganisation. Proponents of nuclear weapons, on
the other hand, argued that one should not take risks with regard to
national security affairs. Given the history of Sino-Indian relations
and especially the 1962 war, China posed a concrete, long-term
threat to India’s security. Deterrence against China, this school of
thought asserted, should be the cornerstone of India’s security policy.
In addition, China could use nuclear weapons to coerce India during a
future dispute and to extend influence in SouthAsia at India’s expense.
Therefore, the seriousness of the Chinese nuclear threat was, from
this perspective, based less on the prospect that China would actually
use nuclear weapons against India, but that they could be applied to
intimidate India as part of a ‘blackmail’ or ‘compellence’ strategy.29
An Indian Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) study
concluded that only an Indian nuclear arsenal could elevate India to
a position of equality with China where the former would be assured
28 Sampooran Singh, India and the Nuclear Bomb (New Delhi: S. Chand, 1971),
p. 105.
29 Shelton I. Williams, The US, India, and the Bomb, Studies in International Affairs
12 (Baltimore, Maryland: Washington Centre for Foreign Policy Research, School of
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1969), pp. 30–2. Thomas
Schelling originally coined the term ‘compellence.’ He defined it as the forcing of an
opponent’s ‘withdrawal, or his acquiescence, or his collaboration’ by threatening to
use military capability. See Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1966), p. 69.
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that it would not be subject to nuclear blackmail and coercion of the
latter.30
Indians also discussed the financial cost of a nuclear arsenal.
Opponents pointed out that it would hamper economic and social
development programmes of the country, which should be the highest
concern for the government. Opponents also claimed that building
and maintaining a nuclear force would be an extra burden on the
Indian economy since it was not a substitute for conventional defence.
But proponents argued that national security should take precedence
over other fiscal matters. Hence, the Indian Government should not
hesitate to build a nuclear arsenal for the defence of the country.
Furthermore, proponents opined that a modest nuclear weapons
programme could be accommodated within the government’s current
level of expenditures. They cited Homi Bhabha’s estimate of an
affordable figure to build an Indian nuclear arsenal.31
A final component of the Indian nuclear debate concerned whether
implied security guarantees from nuclear powers were enough to
ensure India’s security relative to China. The no-bomb group said
that superpowers’ extended deterrence guarantees were good enough
for India’s security. Those who favoured a nuclear force countered that
one should not rely on any outsider’s guarantee for its own national
security. Self-help should be employed to ensure one’s own security.
Over time, it was found that there had been a serious credibility
problem with regard to external security guarantees.
Dynamics for a Policy Shift: Birth of a Nuclear Trajectory
Despite the Shastri Government’s initial stance not to change policy,
pressure on the Prime Minister gradually mounted to review India’s
nuclear policy from multiple directions. Significantly, this pressure
30 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, A Strategy for India for a Credible Posture
Against a Nuclear Adversary (New Delhi: IDSA, 1968), p. 4; Also see S. Gopal, ‘The
Choice,’ Survival, Vol. X, No. 2 (February 1968), especially p. 60.
31 On 24 October 1964, Bhabha in an All India Radio broadcast on the United
Nations Day claimed that nuclear weapons could be made remarkably cheaply.
According to him: ‘a stockpile of some 50 atomic bombs would cost under Rs.10
crores [$21 million] and a stockpile of 50 two-megaton hydrogen bombs something
in the order of Rs. 15 crores [$31.5 million].’ See, Homi J. Bhabha, ‘All India Radio
address,’ 24 October 1964, in Nuclear India Vol. II, ed. J.P. Jain (New Delhi: Radiant
Publishers, 1974), pp. 159–60.
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came not only from the opposition political parties, but also from his
own Congress Party as well as from within the government.
New Delhi Pradesh Congress President, Mushtaq Ahmed, was the
first amongst those in the Congress Party to declare publicly that ‘the
only course for India is to produce her own atom bomb to defend
herself.’32 A robust pressure on the PrimeMinister from his own party
came during the All India Congress Committee (AICC) meeting on
7 and 8November 1964. At the AICCmeeting, one hundred delegates
submitted a petition to the party leadership urging that India acquired
‘an independent nuclear deterrent to protect herself against any
possible threat fromChina.’33 Even theGeneral Secretary of the party,
Bibhuti Mishra, during the AICC discussion on international affairs,
demanded that the Congress policy ought to support the indigenous
manufacturing of nuclear weapons.34
Despite substantial pressure frommany delegates, Shastri remained
firm on his ‘no policy change’ stance. During the meeting, he observed
that India could not ‘go nuclear’ for compelling economic, moral
and political reasons. He argued that the country had already been
suffering badly from the conventional arms build-up and the building
of a nuclear arsenal would force the government to abandon economic
development plans. Moreover, he viewed ‘the possession of nuclear
weapons would be directly opposed to the policy of peace and non-
violence’ of Gandhi and Nehru. The Prime Minister also feared a
bomb decision would have a spiral effect because India ‘could not be
content with one or two bombs. The spirit of competition was bound
to capture her.’ Shastri resisted all pressures and the unanimous final
declaration confirmed the continuation of the existing nuclear policy
line of the government.35
In the last week of November 1964, Lok Sabha held its first debate
on foreign affairs after the Chinese nuclear test. Three alternative
motions on nuclear policy were introduced for debate: one called for
immediate production of an atomic bomb; a second one called for
embarking on ‘nuclear-based defence installations in the country’;
and a third concerned reorienting foreign policy in light of the
Chinese bomb. During the discussion, two options in general were
voiced to deal with the Chinese bomb: either India should seek
32 ‘India Urged to Produce Atom Bomb,’ The Times of India, 26 October 1964.
33 K. Rangaswami, ‘Leaders Reject Demand for Atom Bomb,’ The Hindu,
9 November 1964.
34 The Hindu Weekly, 8 November 1964.
35 Rangaswami, ‘Leaders Reject Demand for Atom Bomb.’
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a nuclear security guarantee from the West or it should build its
own nuclear bomb to counter the Chinese threat. Significantly, these
options were also supported by many governing party members. For
example, Bhagwat Jha Azad supporting the latter option argued that
theChinese intimidation required India to be prepared to ‘go all out to
use nuclear power for the defence of the country.’36 Another Congress
Party member, Harish Chnadra Mathur, argued that India should do
whatever was necessary to defend the country against the Chinese
nuclear threat. He observed: ‘There is no other morality; one moral
duty is the security of this country, the honour of this country and the
safety of this country. Everything else will have to be subjugated to
that.’37
Despite considerable pressure, Shastri was reluctant to change
government’s policy line. On 23 November, the Prime Minister reite-
rated his earlier stand that the Indian Government would stick to
its traditional policy of developing and applying nuclear energy only
for ‘peaceful purposes’ and indicated his government would pursue
nuclear disarmament to tackle the problem.38 However, the next day
(24December) he gave in to the combined pressure of the Parliament
members and slightlymodified his government’s policy, switching over
from a ‘no bomb ever’ stance to a ‘no bomb at present’ position. Shastri
indicated that India had ‘the capacity to produce the atom bomb,’
however, maintained that a decision should be taken in this regard
only ‘after taking into full consideration all the aspects of the question
and what the Members (of Parliament) have said about the change in
policy.’ He further stated:
I do not say that the present policy is rigid and can never change. An individual
may have a policy and a conviction for which he can live and die, but we cannot
take this attitude in the political field. Here situation changes constantly and
we have to adapt our policy to these changes. If some amendment is needed
to what we have said today, we shall make it.39
It was a significant deviation from Shastri’s initial rigid no-bomb
stance. Its importance lay in the implication that the present nuclear
policy was Shastri’s own, based more on intuition and political instinct
than on expert advice and analysis. On 27 November, Jana Sangh
36 Lok Sabha Debates, 10th Session, 3rd Series (23 November 1964), col. 1280.
37 Ibid., col. 1309.
38 Ibid., col. 1134.
39 Shastri delivered his speech in Hindi. An English version of the speech was
printed in Seminar (New Delhi), No. 65 (January 1965), pp. 50–2.
IND IA ’ S NUCLEARISAT ION PROCESS 203
introduced a motion in the Lok Sabha, which called for manufacture
of nuclear weapons. Shastri won a voice vote against the motion. But
he secured it assuring the parliament members that his policy would
not jeopardise national security. In his speech for the first time he
mentioned that India’s nuclear programme would entail ‘peaceful
nuclear explosives.’40
This change was subtle, but critical. By it, Shastri in fact adopted
a ‘nuclear option’ strategy embracing a middle ground (the third
option).41 This strategy was considered to be the pragmatic posture42
at that time given that there were obvious moral, economic and
political reasons for not embarking on an explicit nuclear weapons
programme. More importantly, this policy change paved the way
to undertake the ‘Subterranean Nuclear Explosion Project’ (SNEP),
which Shastri authorised in November 1965.43 There was no im-
mediate possibility of manufacturing nuclear weapons from the
project. However, this initiative’s importance lay in the fact that it
had the implied option to go nuclear from a PNE foundation. Indeed,
it was the beginning of a new era in India’s nuclear programme,
which eventually culminated with the 1974 nuclear explosion. This
explosion provided India the capability and the option to produce
nuclear weapons if it so desired.
India’s Search for a Security Guarantee
PrimeMinister Shastri explored the possibility of an external security
guarantee from the major powers in the aftermath of the Chinese
40 ‘Nuclear RaceWill Ruin Country’s Economy—Shastri’s Firm Stand: ManyM.Ps.
Plead for Change in Policy,’ The Hindu, 28 November 1964 (emphasis author’s).
41 Following the Chinese test, three broad groups supporting three distinct nuclear
policy options emerged within the Congress Party. A bare majority favoured the
building of an independent Indian nuclear force to counter Chinese nuclear threat. A
tiny minority, including the Prime Minister himself, rejected a posture of producing
nuclear weapons. They emphasised nuclear disarmament as a means to counter
the Chinese nuclear threat. A third group advocated a middle course neither to
undertake nor exclude a nuclear weapons programme. Instead of embarking on an
explicit nuclear weapons programme, it favoured a vigorous development of nuclear
technology so that it would be possible to ‘go nuclear’ within a short period of time
if required. This position subsequently came to be known as the policy of ‘nuclear
option.’
42 Major General D. Som Dutt, India and the Bomb, Adelphi Paper 30 (London:
International Institute of Strategic Studies, November 1966), p. 9.
43 Raja Ramanna, Years of Pilgrimage (New Delhi: Viking, 1991), p. 74; Bhatia,
India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 106.
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nuclear test.44 However, he was half-hearted and indecisive over the
nature of seeking an external security guarantee for fear of domestic
opposition and suspicion of any such commitment’s credibility.
Indians in general had serious doubt about the utility of an external
security guarantee.45 In particular, Indians suspected the credibility
of such a guarantee in a crisis scenario. This was reflected in a
conversation between B.K. Nehru, India’s ambassador to the US
and the Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
William Foster, just two weeks after the Chinese nuclear test. During
this conversation, Nehru said that: ‘the United States would not come
to our aid by attacking China if at the same time the Soviet Union said
it would assist China under such an attack.’46 Moreover, many viewed
that an external security guarantee was nothing short of sacrificing
the country’s sovereignty and non-aligned policy and inviting Western
powers to dominate India.
Shastri first raised the issue of a security guarantee to his British
counterpartwhile visitingLondon in earlyDecember of1964. Interest-
ingly, his point was not a ‘specific’ security guarantee for India, but to
devise a general kind of security arrangement under which the United
States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France would provide a
nuclear guarantee to all non-nuclear states. At a press conference on
4 December, Shastri maintained that it was for the nuclear powers to
discuss some kind of guarantee, which was needed not only by India
but also by all the non-nuclear countries.47
Nuclear powers were, at best, vaguely committed to providing
security guarantees to non-nuclear states. US President Lyndon
Johnson observed on 18October 1964, two days after the first Chinese
nuclear test, that the nations that ‘do not seek nuclear weapons
can be sure that if they need our strong support against some
threat of nuclear blackmail, then they will have it.’48 To the Indians,
44 For a general discussion on India’s search for a security guarantee, see A. G.
Noorani, ‘India’s Quest for a Nuclear Guarantee,’ Asian Survey, Vol. VII, No. 7 (July
1967), pp. 490–502.
45 Typical of this position was a commentary by Maharaj K. Chopra, ‘Nuclear
Guarantee is meaningless today,’ The Indian Express, 3May 1967.
46 This meeting took place on 3 November 1964. Cited in Glenn T. Seaborg with
Benjamin S. Loeb, Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years (Lexington, Mass.:
Lexington Books, 1987), p. 118.
47 ‘Shastri asks Big-3 consider guarantee against n-attack,’ The Hindustan Times,
5 December 1964.
48 ‘Radio-Television Address by President Johnson,’ 18 October 1964, printed in
A.C.D.A., Documents on Disarmament, 1964, pp. 465–9.
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this verbal commitment by itself was not enough to protect their
country from the Chinese nuclear threat. Indian diplomats sought
clarification of Johnson’s offer and pressed for a more explicit nuclear
guarantee. However, Washington was not ready to go beyond this
verbal commitment. The Hindustan Times reported that ‘US officials
do not see why they should go beyond the pledge made by President
Johnson on 18 October 1964, to support any country that felt
threatened by Chinese nuclear test.’49
For whatever reasons—the reluctance of the major powers to give
such a guarantee and/or doubts about the credibility of a security
guarantee—India’s search for a binding nuclear deterrence com-
mitment from others ultimately proved futile. Therefore, India
had to pursue a different course as predicated by the looming nuclear
security dilemma emanated from China’s possession of nuclear
weapons. The alternative course that India adopted unfolded incre-
mentally, gradually leading it towards the Pokhran I ‘peaceful’ nuclear
explosion.
Indo-Pakistani War, 1965 and India’s Nuclear Perception
Within eighteen years of their independence, India and Pakistan
fought their second war in 1965 over the disputed territory of
Kashmir.50 In the midst of the intense nuclear debate, this war
impacted substantially on India’s nuclear perception.
For New Delhi, the most disturbing aspect of this conflict was
Beijing’s diplomatic support to Islamabad and its threat to open a
second front along India’s Himalayan borders. On 8 September
1965, China sent an open diplomatic note to India threatening
‘grave consequences’ if India proceeded with military action against
Pakistan.51 The Chinese also increased aggressive troop movements
along border areas raising the spectre of PRC’s military intervention.
Although China did not make good on its crude ultimatum, it
persuaded many Indians, including bureaucrats and politicians, to
conclude that an independent Indian nuclear capability was the only
means to prevent future Chinese nuclear blackmail and intimidation.
49 The Hindustan Times, 27 December 1964.
50 On the origins of this war, see Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia:
The Indo-Pakistani Conflicts since 1947 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1994).
51 William J. Barnds, India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers (London: Pall Mall, 1970),
p. 206.
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For example, on 22 September 1965, a day before the cease-fire
agreement took effect, onehundredmembers of the IndianParliament
petitioned to Prime Minister Shastri demanding an immediate
decision to develop nuclear weapons. The petition referred to the
bitter experience of weapons denial by Western governments during
thewar and emphasised that the security of the countrymust no longer
depend on the ‘mercy or whim of so-called friendly countries.’52
Although many of the petitioners were traditional bomb advocates,
many others joined in this initiative because they considered the
strategic equation of the region had changed. The Chinese ultimatum
was perceived as a sign of increased bullying from Beijing and growing
collusion between China and Pakistan. They also viewed the cessation
of aid by Washington during the conflict as an ominous sign of India’s
growing strategic isolation. Furthermore, they noted that the reticent
attitudes of the USA and the USSR had dashed any hope of assistance
from them in a future conflict with China. Hence, the petitioners
concluded that ‘India’s survival both as a nation and as a democracy,
in the face of the collusion between China and Pakistan, casts a clear
and imperative duty on theGovernment to take an immediate decision
to develope our nuclear weapons.’53
Indira Gandhi and the ‘Nuclear Option’: Early Years
Indira Gandhi succeeded Prime Minister Shastri, who died in the
Soviet (currently Kazakhstan) city of Tashkent immediately after
formalising the cease-fire agreement that formally brought the 1965
Indo-Pakistani War to an end. Showing her abhorrence of nuclear
weapons, the new Prime Minister immediately shelved her prede-
cessor’s subterranean nuclear explosive project (SNEP) after assum-
ing power. BeingNehru’s daughter and deeply influenced byMahatma
Gandhi, it was not a surprising initiative from Indira Gandhi. But
the important point to ponder here is that her initial stance was
soon modified in view of strategic developments that had enormous
implications for India’s national security.
The first serious strategic development that brought a change in
Indira Gandhi’s nuclear stance was the Chinese test of a thermo-
nuclear weapon on 9 May 1966. In reaction to this development,
52 Mirchandani, India’s Nuclear Dilemma, pp. 38–9.
53 Ibid., p. 39.
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the Prime Minister announced in the Lok Sabha that in addition to
‘peaceful’ uses of atomic power, India would increase nuclear tech-
nological know-how and ‘other competence.’54 She did not elaborate
what she meant by the latter term. It was interpreted, however, as
a subtle, but crucial, change in her nuclear policy. It also indicated
that she would pursue Shastri’s policy of developing nuclear ‘explosive’
technology. As the Statesman reported: ‘Most MPs (Member of Parlia-
ment) irrespective of party distinction, said this evening (May 10)
that they detected . . . a subtle change in emphasis from her past
pronouncements. This change, according to numerous MPs . . . is, in
fact, a continuation of the late Shastri’s statement that India’s self-
abnegation in relations to nuclear weapons could not be considered
a commitment for all times.’55 The following day, several executive
members of the Congress Party Parliamentary Group demanded that
India had no alternative but to develop the nuclear bomb in self-
defence or at least to embark on a vigorous pursuit of a nuclear
technological development ‘to an extent where a switch-over to arms
productionwas possible in a short time.’ In reply, Gandhi assured them
that ‘the Government would step up its efforts to develop scientific
and technological know-how in the field of nuclear energy.’ The Prime
Minister also asserted that there was no question of a country like
India depending upon others to defend itself.56
China again stirred India’s strategic nerve by testing a missile
mounted with a nuclear warhead in October 1966. This enhanced
China’s capability to hit targets deep into India. Given this develop-
ment and China’s determination to build a modern nuclear force,
the Indira Gandhi Government began to consider seriously exercising
the nuclear option by embarking on a nuclear weapons programme.
As a US State Department study in 1966 concluded: ‘It is probable
that, without a dramatic alternative, in a few years India will decide
to become a nuclear power.’57 However, Gandhi still chose not to
begin a definite nuclear weapons programme considering its economic,
political and diplomatic fallout. She instead geared up research and
development of India’s nuclear explosive technology. She also resisted
growing non-proliferation pressure from the major powers as was
54 ‘A Subtle Change in Emphasis,’ The Statesman, 11May 1966.
55 Ibid.
56 ‘Congress MPs demand N-bomb,’ The Indian Express, 12May 1966.
57 State Department study S/P-66-34-UNNC4: 11, cited in George Perkovich,
India’s Nuclear Bomb (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), p. 117. Emphasis
original.
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reflected in India’s decision not to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) in 1968.
The NPT and India
Prior to the conclusion of the NPT in 1968, India had been an ardent
proponent of such a treaty. Its support for a non-proliferation treaty
was primarily motivated to prevent China from building a nuclear
arsenal. When such a prospect appeared dim in the emerging NPT,
India chose to stay out of the treaty.
New Delhi had four primary concerns in the formulation of the
NPT. They were: (1) ending further production of nuclear weapons
and delivery systems; (2) securing commitments to pursue nuclear
disarmament; (3) obtaining security guarantees; and (4) retaining
the right to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions. The first three
concerns reflected its security problem emanating primarily from
China’s possession of nuclear weapons, while the fourth manifested
a central aspect of its nuclear posture. India was offered little by
the nuclear powers on these four issues of primary concern. The
objectives of India and the nuclear powers remained far apart in the
NPT. While India wanted a reversal of the current process of nuclear
proliferation, the major powers’ primary aim was to stop further
horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. This gap in objectives
finally hardened India’s stance against the NPT.
India repeatedly voiced its concerns about China’s nuclear weapons
during the NPT negotiations and indicated that if its ‘China problem’
was not addressed, it would stay out of the treaty. The Chinese nuclear
testing during the NPT negotiations with its implied intention to
build a sophisticated nuclear arsenal aggravated India’s concerns. As
External Affairs Minister, M.C. Chagla, declared in Lok Sabha in 1967
that India was ‘under the continuing menace of a country which had
already exploded an atomic bomb, and we will certainly bear in mind
this vital factor’ while considering India’s policy towards the NPT.58
India’s rejection of the NPT in 1968 was a fallout of this concern.
The NPT not only failed to alleviate India’s strategic apprehensions,
it accentuated its insecurity by making China a ‘legal’ nuclear state.
The decision of the Indian Government not to sign the treaty was
58 The Hindu, 28March 1967.
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supported by a majority of the Indian population. A survey in 1972
found that 68.9 per cent showed extremely strong and unqualified
antipathy towards the NPT.59
Furthermore, India’s NPT negotiating postures also reflected one of
the central features of its nuclear policy of the time. As noted earlier,
following theChinese nuclear test, India embarked on a programme of
developing nuclear explosive technology. It was intriguing during the
NPT negotiations that India repeatedly insisted on retaining the right
to conduct ‘peaceful’ nuclear explosions. India’s representative at the
UN explicitly opposed a US-led effort to prohibit non-nuclear weapons
states from conducting peaceful nuclear explosions. He argued that
it was nothing but to deny ‘the benefits of science and technology
to the developing nations of the world.’60 The Indian insistence on
retaining the right to conduct a peaceful nuclear explosion was hence
compatible with its contemporary nuclear policy.
Strategic Dynamics in 1970 and the Sarabhai Profile
Ever since China tested its first nuclear device in 1964, India’s nuclear
perception, debate and policy had primarily been reactive to China’s
nuclear behaviour. On 24 April 1970, when China launched its first
long-range rocket carrying a satellite into orbit, Indians perceived
that this signified a Chinese determination to build a ballistic missile
capability that could hit at distant Indian targets. Surveying the public
mood after the Chinese launching of the satellite, the Indian Institute
of Public Opinion concluded: ‘Reactions in certain circles bordered on
the panicky. The Chinese space feat, it appeared, tended to warp our
perspective; we felt humbled for having lost a race we never chose
to enter. Patriotic voices were raised to undo the damage done to
the nation’s security, to its morale and—this was not said in so many
words—to our national pride.’61 It projected a growing high threat
perception about China’s nuclear and missile capabilities amongst
the Indian public.
59 Ashis Nandy, ‘The Bomb, the NPT and the Indian elites,’ Economic and Political
Weekly, Vol. 7, No. 31–33 (August 1972), p. 1539.
60 ‘Statement by Indian representative (Trivedi) in the First Committee of the
United Nations General Assembly,’ 31 October 1966, in Jain, Nuclear India, Vol. II,
p. 187.
61 Indian Institute of Public Opinion, Monthly Public Opinion Survey, Vol. 17, No. 3
(December 1971), p. 49.
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Following China’s satellite launch, the Indian Parliamentary and
Scientific Committee convened a special seminar on the implications
of Chinese growing missile delivery capability for India’s national
security. The seminar concluded that India had no other alternative
but to go nuclear, which was ‘scientifically feasible, politically
highly desirable, strategically inescapable, and economically not only
sustainable but actually advantageous.’62 In a similar fashion, India’s
two prestigious research institutes—the Indian Council for World
Affairs and the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses—also
organised seminars to discuss country’s nuclear policy in view of
China’s growing nuclear and missile capabilities. The participants at
these seminars also strongly urged the Indian Government to embark
on producing nuclear weapons immediately.63
Against such a backdrop, IAEC Chairman, Vikram Sarabhai,
announced two important decisions that had far-reaching implications
for India’s nuclear policy. The first was that India would not produce
nuclear weapons, but it would retain the option of conducting
underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.64 This implied
that the Indian Government had revived the ‘subterranean nuclear
explosive project,’ which was shelved by Indira Gandhi immediately
after taking over power.
The second initiative concerned the adoption of a ten-year nuclear
and space programme by the Indian Government.65 Known as the
‘Sarabhai Profile,’ the plan was the most ambitious in the history of
India’s nuclear and space development programme. It envisaged a self-
reliant nuclear technological base and an advanced space programme,
which clearly foreshadowed the development of India’smissile delivery
system. The profile justified such an ambitious plan noting that India
in next ten or twenty years ‘would need a very strong base of science
and technology, of industry and agriculture, not only for our economic
well being but for our national integration and for ensuring our security
in the world.’66 The Profile made it clear that India had adopted a
cautious long-term nuclear policy in view of China’s nuclear and
62 ‘MPs and defence experts feel India must go nuclear,’ The Times of India,
10May 1970.
63 Singh, India and the Nuclear Bomb, p. 102.
64 N. Seshagiri, The Bomb! Fallout of India’s Nuclear Explosion (Delhi: Vikas, 1975),
p. ix.
65 Atomic Energy Commission, Government of India, Atomic Energy and Space
Research: A Profile for the Decade 1970–80 (Bombay: Atomic Energy Commission,
Government of India, July 1970).
66 Ibid., p. V. Emphasis added.
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ballistic missile capabilities. Commenting on the space programme,
the Hindu in an editorial concluded that ‘by the end of the decade,
India would have attained some independent proficiency in rocket and
missile development and this would have its value both for civil and
military purposes.’67 The Sarabhai Profile, therefore, manifested an
Indian determination to strengthen the nuclear option by embarking
on a vigorous programme of technology development.
1971 Bangladesh Independence War and the Nuclear Issue
India and Pakistan fought a third war in 1971 within twenty-four
years of their independence.68 Initially beginning as a civil war in the
eastern wing of Pakistan, it ended with India’s military intervention
resulting in the break-up of the country and the emergence of
independent Bangladesh. This war left significant strategic and
nuclear implications for India.
On 10 December 1971, at an intensified stage of Indo-Pakistani
fighting, the US sent the nuclear-capable aircraft carrier—the USS
Enterprise and nine supporting warships to the Bay of Bengal. The
true motive of the Americans behind deploying this vessel was never
made public. However, Henry Kissinger has noted in his memoirs
that the carrier group was deployed ‘ostensibly for the evacuation of
Americans, but in reality to give emphasis to our warnings against an
(Indian) attack on West Pakistan.’69 Indeed, it generated substantial
strategic pressure on India at a crucial stage of the war.
The presence of the Enterprise in the Bay of Bengal during the war
was strategically alarming to the Indians. They conceived it as part of
an American coercive diplomacy to create pressure on New Delhi in
favour of Pakistan. It created a feeling that even superpowers could
pose a nuclear threat to India.70 How far the incident actually affected
India’s subsequent defence planning is unknown, but it did certainly
67 ‘Ambitious Nuclear Programme,’ The Hindu, 28 July 1970.
68 On the 1971 War, see Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh (London: Chatto and Windus, 1975); Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? The
Death of a State (London: Penguin Books, 1982); Richard Sisson and Leo E. Rose,
War and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1990).
69 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 905.
70 In interviews conducted by the author with several strategic experts in New
Delhi, including K. Subrahmanyam, it was pointed out that the US did pose a nuclear
threat to India. This perception basically resulted from the Enterprise incident of 1971.
The Indians were particularly sensitive to the fact that the ship was nuclear. After
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influence India’s threat perception. The Vice Chief of Naval Staff,
Vice Admiral M.R. Schunker, recalled at a seminar in the early 1980s
that ‘thememory of “Exercise Enterprise, 1971” should alert us to the
danger that superpower nuclear threats are not necessarily confined
to mutual deterrent postures: that in certain scenarios, that threat
can be directed against us also.’71
In addition to the Enterprise incident, the Indians perceived the US
‘tilt’ policy toward Pakistan during the war as most ominous.72 It
implied a possible strategic partnership between the US and Pakistan.
Even more frightening to India was the prospect that a US–Pakistan–
China strategic triangle would develop in the near future. After all, the
Indians reasoned, President Nixon used Islamabad as an intermediary
to open up China during the Indo-Pakistani War and Pakistan would
certainly be eager to build a tripartite strategic partnership. Such
a potential brought India closer to the Soviet Union and the two
countries signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation on
9 August 1971. This war indeed prompted India to pursue a more
robust defence and nuclear policy.
Pokhran I
India conducted a PNE at the Pokhran test site on 18 May 1974,
codenamed—‘Buddha Smile.’ It was the culmination of a ten-year
contemplation and policy debate that originally began in reaction to
China’s nuclear test in 1964. The exact date is unknown when Indira
Gandhi actually gave authorisation to go ahead with the preparation
for the test. However, a series of events and decisions over several
years before the test finally led India down the road to Pokhran I.
Against the backdrop of China’s nuclear efforts, Prime Minister
Gandhi informed the Parliament on 31 August 1970 that her govern-
ment was studying the economic and technical issues surrounding
this episode, the Indians also began to view the US base in Diego Garcia as a nuclear
threat to India as well as the great powers’ presence in the Indian Ocean region as
a potential source of nuclear blackmail, intervention, gunboat diplomacy and proxy
wars. See R.N. Misra, Indian Ocean and India’s Security (New Delhi: Mittal Publications,
1986), p. 252.
71 ‘Address by Vice Admiral M.R. Schunker,’ in Nuclear Shadow over the Sub-
Continent, ed. Colonel Pyara Lal (New Delhi: United Service Institution of India,
1981), p. 2.
72 On this, see Christopher Van Hollen, ‘The Tilt Policy Revisited: Nixon–
Kissinger Geopolitics and South Asia,’ Asian Survey, Vol. XX, No. 4 (April 1980),
pp. 339–61.
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peaceful nuclear explosives.73 Thiswas the first serious indication from
her that the Indian Government was considering conducting a nuclear
explosion. Themomentum for a nuclear explosion gradually picked up.
IAEC Chairman, Vikram Sarabhai, told at the Fourth International
Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in September 1971
in Geneva that Indian scientists were developing nuclear explosive
engineering techniques on a top priority basis.74
In May 1972, during a debate on the Ministry of Defence’s annual
budget, all of India’s political parties, save two Communist parties, de-
manded that India should develop nuclear weapons or at least embark
on a programme that would ensure production of nuclear weapons
within a very short time. In reply, Defence Minister, Jagjivan Ram,
informed the Parliamentarians that the ‘Atomic Energy Commission
is studying the technology for conducting underground explosions
for peaceful purposes.’75 Again in November 1972, Lok Sabha
members inquired about the progress of the ‘feasibility study and
other preparations for the experimental nuclear explosions.’ Prime
Minister Gandhi assured the Parliament members that the Atomic
Energy Commission was constantly reviewing the progress in the
technology of underground nuclear explosions both from the theore-
tical and experimental angles and also taking into account their
potential economic benefits and possible environmental hazards.76
Eventually, the explosion took place on 18 May 1974. It was not
very clear when Indira Gandhi took the ‘final decision’ to conduct
the blast in absence of definite government source materials in this
regard. Different persons who were involved in the project have
given different dates of the explosion decision. For example, Defence
Minister Jagjivan Ram said after the test that the decision to explode
a nuclear device was taken ‘three years ago,’ which meant sometime
in 1971.77 IAEC Chairman, Homi Sethna, asserted that he ‘gave
the green signal to Dr. Ramanna and his colleagues to go ahead
with this project’ in May 1972.78 Raja Ramanna, the chief architect
of the device, during a press conference immediately following the
test announced that the nuclear explosion was conceived exactly two
73 Bhabhani Sen Gupta, Nuclear Weapons? Policy Options for India (New Delhi: Sage,
1983), p. 5.
74 Cited in Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 159.
75 Link (New Delhi), 7May 1972, p. 9.
76 Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 20, No. 3 (15 November 1972), col. 49.
77 ‘N-test decision taken in 1971, says J. Ram,’ The Indian Express, 20May 1974.
78 ‘Trombay Plutonium Used for Blast,’ The Hindu, 20May 1974.
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years before when the Purnima research reactor was commissioned on
18 May 1972.79 These conflicting claims indicate that the decision
to conduct a nuclear explosion was taken incrementally connected
by various events and decisions spanning over four years. What is
clear is that in 1970, the Indian Government began to consider
seriously the conduct of a nuclear explosion in view of China’s nuclear
activities. Sentiment for moving ahead gained momentum in the
wake of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. In early 1972, Indira Gandhi
instructed the Atomic Establishment to undertake necessary scientific
and technological preparations for a nuclear explosion pending a
final decision. The Indian Atomic Establishment formed an explosion
supervising committee after receiving these instructions from the
Prime Minister. The committee informed the Prime Minister in
February 1974 that preparations for the explosion were complete.
Gandhi gave final permission for the test almost immediately after
this report.80
Following the explosion, New Delhi was quick to indicate that the
blast had no military implications. However, on several accounts, this
Indian claim, if not grossly misleading, was confusing. There was
hardly any doubt in the fact that it was not a definite Indian step
towards building nuclear weapons.However, it was clearly a significant
step towards strengthening its nuclear option, which eventually paved
the way for India’s building of a nuclear arsenal.
India considered all nuclear explosions as evil before it developed a
visible ‘nuclear option’ policy in the second half of the 1960s. India’s
representative to the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee,
V.C. Trivedi, maintained in August 1965 that ‘all nuclear tests are
basically evil; they encourage evil; and the sooner the evil is dealt with
the better.’81 This formulation was based on the scientific fact that
technologically there was hardly any fundamental difference between
peaceful and military nuclear explosions. In other words, the Indian
Governmentwas aware that a PNE could be used formilitary purposes.
Therefore, India’s claim that the 1974 explosion was ‘only peacefully
motivated’ was contrived. Indeed, the blast manifested a consistency
and continuity in India’s nuclear policy. As noted earlier, India since
the mid-1960s had been developing a nuclear option surrounding
79 Cited in Ravi Kaul, India’s Nuclear Spin-Off (Allahabad: Chanakya Publishing
House, 1974), p. 19.
80 According to Ashok Kapur, the final decision for the explosion was taken ‘on and
around’ 15 February 1974. See Kapur, India’s Nuclear Option, p. 198.
81 A.C.D.A., Documents on Disarmament, 1965, p. 330.
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atomic explosive technology. It was an outgrowth of this policy and a
‘demonstrative blast’ of India’s growing nuclear assertiveness.
Doubts about its peaceful character also arose from the fact that
the Indians never gave an adequate explanation about the results and
accomplishments of the test. There had been no reporting of coherent
scientific or industrial use of the results of the experiment. Nor was
there any evidence that India seriously used the results of this PNE for
its socio-economic or industrial development in subsequent years.82
International reactions also demonstrated that there had been
serious doubts about India’s claim of the explosion’s ‘peaceful’
character. Pakistan was quick to indicate that the explosion validated
its long-held suspicion that India’s nuclear programme was motivated
to build nuclear weapons and it was planning a nuclear explosion
ever since China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964.83 Americans
also expressed concern, considering the adverse impact it might have
on the regional stability and on nuclear non-proliferation efforts in
general. The US Government in reaction ordered a review of aid to
India and an inter-agency review was conducted. It recommended
that international action should be taken to stop India from pursuing
a nuclear aberration and Washington should canvass support for it.84
Canada reacted quite angrily with a sense of ‘betrayal.’ It was alleged
that the plutonium that Indians used in the explosion was extracted
from the CIRUS reactor, which was supplied by Canada. Just four
days after the explosion, Canada stopped shipment of all nuclear
equipments and materials to India and suspended all types of Indo-
Canadian nuclear cooperation. The Canadian Secretary of State for
External Affairs asserted that Canada could not ‘be expected to assist
and subsidize, directly or indirectly, a nuclear programme which, in
a key respect, undermines the position which Canada has for a long
time been firmly convinced is best for world peace and security.’85
However, the majority of the Indian people supported the idea of
developing nuclear strength for defence purposes in the aftermath
82 On this point, see Peter R. Lavoy, Learning to Live with the Bomb? India and
Nuclear Weapons, 1947–1974, unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of California,
Berkeley, 1997, pp. 398–403.
83 Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Road to Chagai: Pakistan’s Nuclear Programme, Its Sources
and Motivations,’ Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4 (October 2002), pp. 879–81.
84 ‘US Orders Review of Aid to India,’ The Times of India, 29May 1974.
85 Swedish International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), ‘nuclear-weapon proli-
feration,’ SIPRI Yearbook 1975: World Armament and Disarmament (London: MIT Press,
1975), p. 21.
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of the 1974 explosion. A nation-wide survey found that 59% of the
respondents supported such an idea.86 Weighing up all political and
diplomatic costs, India, therefore, decided to live with keeping the
nuclear option open. The 1974 explosion was not really considered by
NewDelhi to be anuclearweapon test.However, thiswas an exercise of
weapons option based on a proven technology. Its implication had been
that it strengthened the viability of theweapons option through having
the independent capability to initiate a military nuclear programme.
It can also be considered as a technological and political signal of
intent and capability.
Two questions in particular—why India conducted a nuclear
explosion in 1974 and why it conducted the explosion at the time it
did—have since generated substantial controversy, which are also
important in the context of the general debate on nuclear prolifera-
tion. Dhirendra Sharma, for example, has concluded that it was
the ‘backroom boys’ spirit of the scientists that pushed Gandhi to
eventually authorise the explosion.87 In this contention, the techno-
logical momentum and the bureaucratic politics arguments have
been employed to explain the 1974 Indian nuclear explosion. In a
major study on India’s nuclear programme, George Perkovich has also
concluded that the ‘Pokhran blast stemmed primarily from domestic
dynamics’ meaning that scientists’ push and Gandhi’s motivation to
score domestic political gains were mainly responsible for the Indian
test.88
But a careful scrutiny of the events and factors that led India
toward the first Pokhran test reveals that more fundamental strategic
imperatives were rooted in the Indian decision. As can be observed
from the preceding discussion, Indians had been debating and contem-
plating a viable nuclear policy over many years in the context of
long-term Chinese nuclear threat. The 1974 nuclear explosion was a
culmination of India’s search for a nuclear strategy against a growing
nuclear security dilemmaprecipitated by theChinese nuclearweapons
programme.
86 K.P. Misra and J.S. Gandhi, ‘India’s Nuclear Explosion: A Study in Perspectives,’
International Studies (New Delhi), Vol. 14, No. 3 (July-September 1975), p. 351.
87 Sharma, India’s Nuclear Estate, p. 5.
88 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 187. In a simitar fashion, Frank Bray and
Michael Moodie have concluded that the 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion was carried
out to ‘influence domestic, rather than world, opinion.’ See Frank T.J. Bray and
Michael L. Moodie, ‘Nuclear Politics in India,’ Survival, Vol. XIX, No. 3 (May–June
1977), pp, 111–16.
IND IA ’ S NUCLEARISAT ION PROCESS 217
India’s decision to carry out a nuclear explosion was thus a politico-
strategic one. Even assuming that nuclear scientists and bureaucrats
created pressure on Gandhi to conduct the explosion, the decision
was ultimately politico-strategic. It is noteworthy that Indira Gandhi
shelved the SNEP immediately after assuming power in 1966. She
took this decision primarily based on moralistic ground. However,
she revived the project afterwards under the pressure of regional
strategic developments and intensifying regional nuclear security
dilemma. This incident highlighted the strategic nature of the
Indian nuclear explosion decision. As can be observed, scientists and
bureaucrats could not stop Gandhi from initially stalling the project.
This factor also nullifies the technological momentum argument. If
the technological argument were valid, the SNEP first of all would
not have stalled. The revival of the SNEP was not an act of the
scientists either. As noted earlier, the decision evolved gradually over
the years based on careful assessment of threat perception emanated
from Chinese nuclear activities and the intensifying regional nuclear
security dilemma.
Neither was Indira Gandhi’s PNE decision motivated to score
domestic political gains. When the decision to go ahead with the
preparation for the nuclear explosion was taken by Gandhi, she was
at a peak of popular support following India’s win in the 1971 Indo-
Pakistani War. George Perkovich has noted, ‘it may be conjectured
that support in principle for developing a nuclear explosive device was
solidified by late 1971, that concentrated work on building the vital
components began in spring 1972, and that formal Prime Ministerial
approval to make final preparations for a PNE occurred in September
1972.’89 Therefore, Indira Gandhi’s decision was not precipitated by
her consideration to upgrade domestic political support. Furthermore,
the domestic politics argument was not valid, because she did not use
this method when she was in trouble politically in 1976 or 1977. If
she were motivated to score domestic political points, her naturally
preferred step would have been to conduct another nuclear explosion
in 1976 or in early 1977 before the general election. Indira Gandhi
herself once argued: ‘How could it have been political? There were
no elections coming up . . . It would have been useful for elections.
But we did not have any.’90 It can be concluded that the domestic
89 Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, p. 172.
90 Cited in Rodney W. Jones, ‘India,’ in Non-proliferation: The why and wherefore, ed.
Jozef Goldblat (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985), p. 114.
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politics and the technologicalmomentumargumentswere not primary
components in India’s decision to conduct a nuclear explosion in 1974.
Phase III: 1974–1998
Toward Pokhran II
For over two decades after the 1974 nuclear explosion, India pursued
a policy of nuclear ambiguity—neither confirming nor denying its
pursuit of amilitary nuclear programme.At times, the programmewas
slowed down, but the development and perfection of nuclear weapons
and missile delivery-related technologies was never stopped. Various
domestic factors (personal, moral, ideological, economic, and social)
combined with an international environment still viewed by India
as basically hostile to justifying the development of a nuclear power
affected India’s nuclear programme. Eventually the Indian strategic
programme culminated with the Pokhran II, highlighting the fact
that an intensifying South Asian nuclear security dilemma prevailed
over all other considerations in governing India’s nuclear policy
choices.
Janata Interlude: Nuclear Sanity?
The brief Janata rule from 1977–1980, which was the first non-
Congress administration in Indianhistory, provides important insights
about the change and continuity in India’s nuclear policy. The new
Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, immediately after assuming power
announced that he would reassess India’s previous nuclear policy and
promised that India would not conduct any further nuclear explosions
including PNEs.91 It meant three things. First, the new government
would distance itself from Indira Gandhi’s past nuclear policies.
Second, it signalled that the new Prime Minister would adopt a more
normative approach with regard to nuclear issues.92 Finally, with such
a posture, Desai hoped that his policy would help to win back nuclear
energy assistance from the United States and Canada.
91 The Statesman, 25March 1977.
92 Desai even vowed: ‘Even if the whole world is going to have it (nuclear weapons),
I am not going to be a party (in this process).’ The Patriot, 7May 1977.
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However, Desai’s initial hardline anti-nuclear stance was sub-
sequently moderated. This changed stance was first reflected in his
speech in Lok Sabha on 26 July 1978. He stated that he only barred
‘explosions,’ but all along was in favour of ‘blasts.’93 He explained that
explosions were needed only for ‘political purposes’ and actually did
not enhance any further knowledge. According to Desai, underground
engineering projects, like digging of canals and dams, exploration of
oil, extraction of low-grademetal ores, required blasts, not explosions.
But the simple fact was that technologically there was no basic
difference between explosion and blast. This, in fact, reflected a subtle,
but crucial, deviation from his original nuclear stance.
Two factors critically influenced Desai’s subsequent deviation from
his initial nuclear policy. First, Desai’s initial anti-nuclear stance
was proved untenable in the context of China’s modernisation of its
nuclear arsenal and Pakistan’s growing nuclear potential, which even
caused a rift within the government (in particular between the Prime
Minister and the Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram).94 During Desai’s
time in office, Pakistan was in a serious clandestine endeavour to
acquire a nuclear weapons capability. Pressure was mounting on the
JanataGovernment to respond to the loomingPakistani nuclear threat
with a similar Indian programme. As if to vindicate this perception,
Washington suspended aid to Pakistan on 6 April 1979 invoking the
Symington Amendment95 alleging that Islamabad was attempting to
develop nuclear weapons. This incident caused substantial strategic
concerns in India about Pakistan’s ‘Islamic Bomb.’96 Hence, the
Indian Government became bound to revive the nuclear explosive
programme.97
Second, Desai’s efforts of winning back American and Canadian
nuclear cooperation remained largely unrealised during his tenure
as Prime Minister. President Jimmy Carter’s tough anti-proliferation
policy and the adoption of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA)
by the US Congress in 1978 made a nuclear reconciliation between
93 The Statesman, 27 July 1978.
94 Amrita Bazar Patrika (Kolkata), 2 July 1979.
95 In 1976, the US Congress adopted the Symington Amendment to the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961. This Amendment prohibited most US economic and military
assistance to any country delivering or receiving nuclear enrichment equipment,
material, or technology not safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
96 Swadesh Rana, ‘The Islamic Bomb,’ India Today, 1–15 June 1979, pp. 88–9.
97 Inderjit Badhwar, ‘Confused Preferences,’ India Today, 16–30 September 1979,
pp. 55–9.
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India and the US difficult. Despite considerable efforts, Desai also
failed to reconcile the nuclear differences with Canada. His futile
efforts were increasingly regarded as appeasement and a sell out
of India’s national interests.98 Hence, Desai’s initial nuclear policy
gradually became vulnerable.
Before evolving Janata’s nuclear policy any further, the government
collapsed in July 1979 due to internal bickering. After the fall of Desai,
interim Prime Minister, Charan Singh, was quick to indicate that he
intended to keep nuclear options open.99 Indeed, Charan Singh was
the first to express concern officially from New Delhi about Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons programme. In his 1979 Independence Day (15
August) address, the Prime Minister maintained that if Pakistan
had gone nuclear, India would ‘review’ its nuclear policy.100 By
1979, Pakistan’s nuclear potential, in fact, had become an important
factor in New Delhi’s nuclear policy planning. As Defence Minister
C. Subramaniam observed at amajor defence policy speech inOctober
1979, the concept of national defence must be much wider and
argued if countries like Israel, SouthAfrica, and Pakistan had acquired
nuclear weapons capabilities, India ‘would have to take some difficult
decisions in regard to nuclear weapons.’101
Strategic Dynamics in the 1980s: Global and Regional
Dimensions
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 dramatically
changed the South Asian strategic landscape deeply impacting upon
India’s nuclear perception. Ominously enough, it placed Pakistan in a
more advantageous position than India in the ensuing US–Soviet Cold
War equation. The US needed Pakistan as a strategic ally to resist the
USSR’s westward expansion and to channel aid to anti-Soviet forces
in Afghanistan.
Signalling a change in the US policy approach towards Pakistan,
the Carter Administration soon suspended the application of the
Symington Amendment that had previously stopped assistance to
98 For example, the Congress Working Committee (CWC) adopted a resolution
expressing such a view in New Delhi on 7 August 1977. See The Indian Express,
8 August 1977.
99 ‘India to Keep Nuclear Options,’ The New York Times, 28 July 1979.
100 The Indian Express, 16 August 1979.
101 ‘India Cannot Foreclose Nuclear Options—Subramaniam,’ The Hindu,
30 October 1979.
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Pakistan. It offered Islamabad a $300 million economic aid package.
Subsequently, the Reagan Administration provided $3.2 billion eco-
nomic and military assistance to Pakistan as a reward for helping
the US to fight against perceived Soviet expansion in Southwest
Asia. This aid package included, ominously from India’s viewpoint,
a sale of forty F-16 advanced fighting aircraft. Indians viewed that
Pakistan’s acquisition of F-16 would fundamentally change the con-
ventional balance of power between India and Pakistan.102 Worse
yet, Washington began to show a lax attitude towards Pakistan’s
nuclear weapons programme. Furthermore, New Delhi feared that a
Washington–Islamabad–Beijing axis would materialise in the context
of SovietUnion’s Afghan occupation, whichwould dramatically change
India’s strategic environment. In addition, the Indian Government be-
came worried over the prospect that this development in Afghanistan
and a resultant Washington–Islamabad–Beijing axis would pave the
way for further Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear and missile
development programmes.
Against the backdrop of unfolding Afghan drama, Indira Gandhi
returned to power in January 1980. Upon reassuming the Prime
Ministership, Gandhi quickly moved to reverse her predecessor’s
nuclear explosion policy. On 17 February 1980, she asserted that
India did not believe in making nuclear weapons, but should be free
to carry out experiments if it was deemed necessary.103 Clarifying this
policy stance, she announced in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of the
Indian Parliament) that ‘there would be no hesitation in conducting
these (nuclear explosions) in the national interests.’ New Delhi, she
added, ‘should not be caught napping’ if Pakistan had acquired the
capability to produce nuclear weapons.104
Under the Afghan shadow, Pakistan had been making rapid pro-
gress towards acquiring a capability to produce nuclear weapons. In
particular, its progress in the production of fissile materials in Kahuta
Uranium Enrichment Plant was alarming from an Indian perspective.
New Delhi began to suspect that Pakistan would soon detonate a nuc-
lear device. As Indian Atomic Energy Commission Chairman, Homi
102 To pacify the Indians, Washington argued that supply of conventional weapons
would reduce Pakistan’s temptation to acquire nuclear weapons; however, India
was not convinced. See, Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1992), p. 383.
103 The Statesman, 14March 1980.
104 ‘PM for Peaceful Nuclear Tests in National Interests,’ The Times of India,
14March 1980.
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Sethna, speculated in May 1981, Pakistan could explode a nuclear
device in the near future (in 1981 or 1982).105
Given such a prospect, India was caught in a dilemma in formulating
a clear nuclear strategy. This dilemma was reflected in two specific
developments in 1982. In early 1982, Indira Gandhi reportedly
authorised preparations for a second peaceful nuclear explosion.106
This was not carried out ultimately for ‘unexplained reasons.’ Fear
of negative international economic and political fallout could have
been the main reason why Indira Gandhi finally abandoned the plan.
However, the episode highlighted an indecisiveness in India’s nuclear
policy in the midst of an intensifying nuclear security dilemma in
South Asia.
A second development was India’s drawing up of a pre-emptive
strike strategy against Pakistan’s nuclear facilities to prevent it from
acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. The Washington Post reported
in late 1982, based on leaked US intelligence sources, that India’s
military commanders had prepared a contingency plan for launching
air strikes on Pakistan’s uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta and the
small reprocessing facility at PINSTECH in Rawalpindi.107 Such a pre-
emptive strike was never carried out. Fear of a general war between
India and Pakistan, and the latter’s ability to conduct retaliatory
air strikes on Indian nuclear facilities prevented New Delhi from
undertaking such an action. However, this incident also highlighted
India’s rapidly growing concern over the prospect of a Pakistani
nuclear bomb.
With the growing pace of Indo-Pakistani nuclear competition and
in the context of an intensifying tripartite nuclear security dilemma
involving India, Pakistan and China, New Delhi had to pay serious
attention to the development of missile delivery systems. Indian policy
planners felt that without proper delivery systems, India’s nuclear
option would not be credible.108 In July 1983, India launched the
‘Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme’ (IGMDP) and
placed it under the Defence Research and Development Organization
105 ‘Pak N-Blast Any Time after June: Sethna,’ The Hindustan Times, 6May 1981.
106 Bharat Karnad, ‘Another Pokhran test in offing?’ The Hindustan Times, 23 April
1982.
107 Milton R. Benjamin, ‘India Said to Eye Raid on Pakistani A-Plant,’ The
Washington Post, 20 December 1982.
108 For a perceptive analysis of India’s missile development and capabilities, see
Anupam Srivastava, ‘India’s Growing Missile Ambitions: Assessing the Technical and
Strategic Dimensions,’ Asian Survey, Vol. XL, No. 2 (March–April 2000), pp. 311–41.
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(DRDO) for its implementation. It clearly signalled that India
was determined to develop a viable nuclear deterrent capability.
K. Subrahmayam maintained that the IGMDP made it clear that
‘India was aiming at developing its nuclear option further.’109
The IGMDP included an anti-tank missile—Nag, two surface-to-
air missiles—Akash and Trishul, one medium range surface-to-surface
missile—Prithvi, and an intermediate range ballistic missile—Agni.
There was no indication from the Indian Government about nuclear
implications of the IGMDP at the time of its launching. However,
questions were raised and suspicions were expressed with regard to
the inclusion of the Agni and Prithvi in the programme. Agni’s inclusion
in particular was significant indeed, because without nuclear warheads
on this missile, its development would make little sense. Questions
were also raised with regard to the inclusion of the Prithvi in the
IGMDP. This missile system could be used as a conventional explosive
delivery vehicle although it would be more lethal (as well as cost-
effective) if nuclear warheads were tipped on it. A retired Indian army
officer has observed that ‘Prithvi’s potential as a decisive weapon of
war is not when it carries conventional munitions load, but when (it
is) tipped with a nuclear device.’110
The Indo-Pakistani nuclear dynamics acquired a new twist when
Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist, A. Q. Khan, claimed in an interview
in early 1984 that Pakistan could produce weapons-grade enriched
uranium.111 Indian leaders and the general public took this revelation
seriously. Worse yet, this development coincided with the press
report that US President Ronald Reagan had written a letter to
his Pakistani counterpart, Zia-ul Haq, seeking the latter’s promise
that Pakistan would not enrich uranium beyond five per cent. In
the same news item, the Newa-i-Waqt also reported that in return
America was ready to provide nuclear guarantee to Pakistan the kind
of atomic umbrella it provided to NATO member countries.112 These
two developments set off alarm bells in India. The reaction of K.C.
Khanna, a prominent Indian journalist, was typical in this regard.
He observed that India should immediately respond by declaring
109 K. Subrahmanyam, ‘India’s Nuclear Policy—1964–1998,’ in Nuclear India,
ed. Jasjit Singh (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998), p. 39.
110 Lieutenant General (Retired) Harwant Singh, ‘Prithvi’s Accuracy,’ Vayu No. 4
(1994), p. 30.
111 The interview was taken on 10 February 1984. It was published in Urdu daily
Nawa-i-Waqt. An English version is reprinted in Defence Journal (Karachi), Vol. X,
No. 4 (1984), p. 41.
112 Cited in Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb, pp. 257–8.
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explicitly its nuclear weapons capabilities.113 Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi subsequently announced in Lok Sabha in March 1984 that
‘My government is aware of Pakistan’s effort to acquire uranium
enrichment capability to assemble a nuclear weapon. This does not,
however, mean that Pakistan is ahead of India in atomic energy
development. Indian scientists are keeping abreast of all aspects of
research and development connected with enrichment technology.’114
This statement typified India’s policy of nuclear ambiguity and steady
strengthening of its nuclear option during this time.
By the mid-1980s, Pakistan’s international procurement efforts for
building a military nuclear programme and its significant progress
towards acquiring a nuclear weapons capability had become quite
evident.115 To confirm this, A.Q. Khan indicated in an interview
on 14 March 1985 that Pakistan, if required, could carry out an
atomic explosion.116 On 11 July 1985, the American ABC television
network reported that Pakistan had successfully tested the non-
nuclear triggering package for a nuclear weapon.117 This was a major
breakthrough and a concrete stepmade by Pakistani scientists towards
achieving a nuclear weapons capability by Pakistan.
Given the above context, it was not surprising that all political
parties, except the communists, felt that India should build nuclear
weapons to counter Pakistan’s nuclear capability.118 At the All India
Congress Committee (AICC)meeting on 4May 1985, PrimeMinister
Rajiv Gandhi assured that his government would be ‘looking into
various aspects of this question to see what action we should take.’119
In fact, Rajiv did build a robust nuclear option during his time in office.
He ensured that India kept itself abreast of latest technologies in
order to maintain a credible (although ambiguous) nuclear deterrent.
In 1984, India imported ninety-five kilograms of beryllium fromWest
Germany intended to be used in a newly commissioned beryllium
113 The Times of India, 28March 1984.
114 The Statesman, 23March 1984. Emphasis added.
115 Inderjit Badhwar, ‘Explosive Links,’ India Today, 16–31 March 1985, p. 74. In
March 1985, a West German court convicted a German businessman for smuggling
an entire chemical plant for producing uranium hex fluoride—the gasified material
used in uranium enrichment—between 1977 and 1980. See Leonard Spector with
Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989–1990
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 91.
116 Hurmat, 14 March 1985, translated and reprinted in Dr. A.Q. Khan on Pakistan
Bomb, ed. Sreedhar (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1987), p. 79.
117 Spector, Nuclear Ambitions,note 25, p. 332.
118 ‘India Can Meet Pak. N-Threat: Minister,’ The Times of India, 8 August 1985.
119 Ibid.
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plant, which experts suggested could be used in India’s nuclear and
missile programmes.120 This was clearly indicative of India’s vigorous
pursuit of a viable nuclear option. Indian scientists also reportedly
began work, with Rajiv’s approval, on thermonuclear weapons in late
1984 or early 1985.121
TheBrasstacksmilitary exercises conducted by the IndianArmy in the
Rajastan desert along the Indo-Pakistani border between December
1986 andMarch 1987 pushed the Indo-Pakistani nuclear competition
to a new height.122 During the course of the crisis, Pakistani scientist
A.Q. Khan gave an interview to prominent Indian journalist Kuldip
Nayar. In the interview, Khan confirmed that ‘what the CIA has
been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct and so is the
speculation of some foreign newspapers. . . .They told us that Pakistan
could never produce the bomb and they doubted my capabilities, but
they now knowwe have done it . . .Nobody can undo Pakistan or take us
for granted.We are there to stay and let it be clear that we shall use the
bomb if our existence is threatened.’123 The basic objective of Khan’s
interview was, in fact, to communicate a nuclear deterrence signal to
NewDelhi during the course of the crisis. By doing so Islamabadmade
it clear that Pakistan had nuclear weapons and would not hesitate
to use them in case of an Indian military attack on it. As Pakistani
daily the Muslim’s editor, Mushahid Hussain, who was present during
the interview, commented: ‘Themessage given by Dr. A.Q. Khan . . . is
directed against all those detractors of Pakistan’s “Islamic Bomb.” To
the Indians, it is a “hands-off Pakistan” message at a time when New
Delhi has been carrying out massive warlike exercises all along our
eastern border.’124
The nuclear signal from Pakistan was absolved by India with belli-
cose hostility. PrimeMinister Rajiv confidently announced: ‘We intend
meeting President Zia’s threat. We will give an adequate response.’125
120 Michael Knapik and Mark Hibbs, ‘German Firm’s Beryllium Export to India
May Have Violated U.S. Law,’ Nucleonics Week, No. 30, Special Report (30 January
1989).
121 David Albright and Tom Zamora, ‘India, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons: all the
pieces in place,’ Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 45, No. 5 (June 1989), p. 25.
122 For a detailed discussion on the Brasstacks crisis, see Kanti Bajpai, P.R. Chari,
Pervaiz IqbalCheema, StephenPhilipCohen and SumitGanguly,Brasstacks andBeyond:
Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995).
123 Kuldip Nayar, ‘Pakistan Has the Bomb,’ The Tribune (Chandigarh), 1 March
1987, reprinted in Strategic Digest (New Delhi), Vol. XVII, No. 5 (May 1987), pp. 7–8.
124 ‘Bomb Controversy,’ The Muslim (Islamabad), 3March 1987.
125 TomDiaz, ‘Gandhi Warns U.S. Is “Soft” on “Islamic Bomb” Threat,’Washington
Times, 27March 1987.
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Defence Minister, K.C. Pant, also assured that the Indian army would
not be at a disadvantage in case of a Pakistani nuclear attack. Pant
asserted: ‘the emerging nuclear threat to us from Pakistan is forcing
us to review our options . . . I assure the House that our response will
be adequate to our perception of the threat.’126 Defence scientist
Raja Ramanna also confirmed that India could retaliate ‘in kind’ if
confronted a nuclear attack.127
The revelation of Khan about the state of Pakistan’s nuclear
programmemade an immediate impact on the Indian public. An India
Today survey in the aftermath of the Brasstacks crisis revealed that 69
percent of the survey respondents believed that Pakistan had nuclear
weapons and 68 percent ‘felt India should take a similar path.’128 The
crisis indeed underscored the worsening nuclear security dilemma in
South Asia.
By the late 1980s, India had substantially closed the gap between a
decision to produce nuclear weapons and their actual development to
a bare minimum. Around 1988, Rajiv Gandhi authorised the nuclear
scientists and engineers at the BARC and the DRDO laboratories
to refine nuclear weapons designs by reducing the size and weight
of fission devices while increasing their explosive yields. Also signi-
ficantly, the Prime Minister approved several major steps for building
an Indian nuclear deterrent capability, such as the preparation of
ready-to-assemble devices, increasing the number of such devices,
and dispersing such weapons components around the country. In a
personal recollection, K. Subrahmanyam has noted that India had
achieved a nuclear deterrent by 1990.129 Between 1988 and 1990,
Subrahmanyam claimed, India readied at least two dozen nuclear
weapons for quick assembly and potential dispersal to airbases for
delivery by aircraft for retaliatory attacks against Pakistan.130
End of the Cold War: Deteriorating Security Environment
The abrupt end of the Cold War and consequent global structural
change heralded an uncertain strategic environment for India. It
126 ‘India Announces Review of Nuclear Policy,’ Reuters. 27March 1987.
127 Chris Smith, India’s Ad Hoc Arsenal: Direction or Drift in Defence Policy? (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 191.
128 Dilip Bobb and Ramindar Singh, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Bombshell,’ India Today,
31March 1987, p. 73.
129 Subrahmanyam, ‘Indian Nuclear Policy—1964–1998,’ p. 44.
130 K. Subrahmanyam, ‘Politics of Sakhti,’ The Times of India, 26May 1998.
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meant the loss of a traditional strategic ally and reliable arms
supplier—the Soviet Union. New Delhi also lost Moscow’s veto-
wielding support on the question of Kashmir at the United Nations.
Moreover, and critically from India’s point of view, the Soviet Union
couldno longer be counted on to provide a counterweight toChina.The
security guarantee implied in the 1971 Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty
was rendered practically invalid in the new international order. Given
the fact that India and theUnited Stateswere never strategic partners,
the structural change of the international system intensified India’s
security concerns. Moreover, China and Pakistan’s strategic postures
in the post-Cold War era aggravated New Delhi’s strategic anxiety. In
1993 and again in 1995, China conducted a series of nuclear tests
and deployed nuclear warheads in Tibet targeting India.131 This
development, along with China’s assistance to Pakistan in developing
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile systems,132 contributed to inten-
sify the existing South Asian security dilemma substantially from the
Indian point of view. In such a circumstance, India had to develop
an independent and self-reliant defence posture that involved nuclear
weapons.
Kashmir Crisis, 1990
In a fluid and an uncertain strategic environment, theKashmir dispute
flared up in 1990, nearly leading India and Pakistan to a fourth
major war with possible nuclear implications. The crisis developed
in the wake of an intensifying anti-Indian insurgency movement in
Indian-administered Kashmir.133 India alleged that the insurgents
were backed and aided by Pakistan. New Delhi, hence, planned to
131 R. Chandran, ‘New Chinese Missiles Target India: US Daily,’ The Times of India,
11 July 1997. Also, see Colonel A. Sahgals and Colonel T. Singh, ‘Nuclear Threat
from China: An Appraisal,’ Trishul, Vol. 6, No. 2 (January 1994), pp. 32, 36.
132 On China’s help to Pakistan’s missile and nuclear programmes, see US Central
Intelligence Agency, ‘Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Techno-
logy Related toWeapons ofMassDestruction andAdvancedConventionalMunitions,’
7 September 2001, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian sep 2001.htm>;
Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, ‘Chinese Assistance to Pakistani Nuclear and
Missile Facilities,’ http://cins.miis.edu/research/india/china/prcpak.pdf; and Nayan
Chanda et al., “The Race Is On,’ Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 161, No. 24
(11 June 1998), pp. 20–2.
133 For a detailed background on the development of the Kashmir insurgency,
see Sumit Ganguly, ‘Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency: Political Mobilization and
Institutional Decay,’ International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 76–107.
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strike deep into Pakistani territory to destroy training camps and
sanctuaries of the insurgent groups. Islamabad, anticipating such an
Indianmove, put its army and air force on alert. Military tensions soon
escalated to the brink of a war and reportedly both countries prepared
themselves to confront a nuclear attack from the other. Both later
denied that the crisis spiralled to the level of nuclear brinkmanship.
However, in the wake of escalating crisis, American President George
Bush sent hisDeputyNational Security Adviser, RobertGates, to India
andPakistan in order to defuse the crisis. American journalist Seymour
Hersh later described this sequence of events in graphic detail:
Sometime in the early spring of 1990, intelligence that was described
as a hundred per cent reliable—perhaps an N.S.A. intercept—reached
Washington with the ominous news that General Beg had authorized the
technicians at Kahuta to put together nuclear weapons. Such intelligence, of
‘smoking gun’ significance, was too precise to be ignored or shunted aside.
The new intelligence also indicated that General Beg was prepared to use
the bomb against India if necessary. Precisely what was obtained could not be
learned, but one American summarized the information as being, in essence,
a warning to India that if ‘youmove up here’—that is, begin a ground invasion
into Pakistan—‘we’re going to take out Delhi.’134
A Pakistani nuclear expert supported Hersh’s account. Professor
Pervaiz Hoodbhoy asserted that during the course of the 1990 crisis
‘Pakistan assembled the different components (of a bomb) it had and
developed a crude nuclear device.’135 It is evident that Pakistan projec-
ted a clear nuclear deterrence posture during the 1990Kashmir crisis.
Against this Pakistani move, India also undertook measures to
communicate a nuclear signal to its rival. In the wake of the crisis,
Indian Prime Minister, V.P. Singh, appointed Raja Ramanna as
Minister of State for Defence and P.K. Iyengar as the Chairman
of the IAEC. These appointments were significant in terms of
communicating a nuclear signal to Pakistan and meant that India
was increasing its nuclear preparedness.136
The 1990Kashmir crisis heralded a new era in South Asian nuclear
competition. It indeed established a rudimentary regional nuclear
134 Seymour M. Hersh, ‘On the Nuclear Edge,’ The New Yorker, 29 March 1993,
p. 64.
135 Pervaiz Hoodbhoy, ‘Nuclear Deterrence—An Article of Faith,’ The News,
17 March 1993. Hoodbhoy also discussed about the issue in an interview with the
author in May 1999.
136 ‘Iyengar, Ramanna Appointments Open Bomb Speculation in India,’ Nucleonics
Week, Vol. 31, No. 8 (22 February 1990).
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deterrence system. As Devin Hagerty has concluded. ‘A strong case
can be made that India and Pakistan were deterred from war in 1990
by the existence of mutual nuclear weapon capabilities and the chance
that, nomatter what Indian and Pakistani decision-makers said or did,
anymilitary clash could escalate to the nuclear level.’137 The crisis once
again reaffirmed the utility of nuclear weapons from the perspective
of both Pakistan and India.
India’s strategic nerve was alarmingly frayed when Pakistan’s
Foreign Secretary, Shahriar Khan, claimed in an interview with the
Washington Post that his country had built necessary components and
know-how to assemble at least one nuclear device.138 The Indian
anxiety was further reinforced by two specific developments in 1993
and 1994. A leaked American intelligence report in 1993 concluded
that China had supplied M-11missiles or components of this delivery
system to Pakistan.139 It aggravated India’s uncertainty about China’s
intentions in the subcontinent and its anxiety over Sino-Pakistani
collusion. This anxiety was again exacerbated with the revelation
of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif at a public meeting on 23
August 1994 that Pakistan possessed an atomic bomb.140 As former
PrimeMinister, his disclosure appeared to be credible in that Pakistan
had already assembled bomb components and readied them for
deployment. This marked a new stage in the South Asian nuclear
competition.
By the mid-1990s, India was standing at the cross-road of a
declaratory and non-declaratory nuclear deterrent posture, while still
pursuing a policy of nuclear ambiguity. It is not clear whether at this
stage India had actually built a nuclear arsenal, but it had certainly
reached a point from where it could assemble nuclear weapons within
a short period of time. The Indian public security discourse at this
stage was that India maintained an adequate nuclear preparation
as a precaution to confront an uncertain strategic environment.141
137 Devin T. Hagerty, ‘Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani
Crisis,’ International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 107–8.
138 Steve Coll, ‘U.S. Nuclear Diplomacy in South Asia Faces Obstacles,’ The
Washington Post, 8 February 1992.
139 Brahma Chellaney,Nuclear Proliferation: The US-Indian Conflict (London: Sangam
Books, 1993), p. 253.
140 The Muslim, 24 August 1994.
141 Manoj Joshi, ‘Doctrine for the Bomb,’ The Morning Sun (Dhaka), 6 January
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The precise nature of India’s deterrent posture was also debated.
For example, K. Subrahmayam argued that India did not need to
match China or Pakistan’s nuclear force, rather it should concentrate
on the construction of a ‘minimum nuclear deterrent.’142 Although
that deterrent was yet to be defined precisely, it was indicative of
a new nuclear era. Strategic imperatives at this stage dictated that
India carried out nuclear tests in order to maintain a credible nuclear
deterrence posture. But fear of international fallout from doing so
constrained India from pursuing this policy course. Even so, the
crossing of the nuclear rubicon was increasingly imminent. Regional
and international strategic developments in the next few years would
prove to be decisive in India’s advancing of an overt nuclear posture.
1995 NPT Renewal and the ‘Near Test’ Incident
TheNPTwas extended for an indefinite period bymore than 170 coun-
tries in the 1995NPTReview and ExtensionConference. India did not
participate in the conference and severely criticised, like before, that
the ‘indefinite extension of the NPT perpetuates the discriminatory
aspects and provides legitimacy to the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear
weapons States.’143 Following this development, India began to fear
that now itwould be isolated internationally and face extremepressure
from the major nuclear powers to sign the treaty, or at least to agree
to international inspection of its own nuclear facilities. However, still
India remained firm on its stance that its own security imperatives
demanded to stay out of the treaty until the other nuclear powers
(primarily China) gave up their nuclear weapons.
As the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) moved toward
conclusion in 1995, India found that any window of diplomatic oppor-
tunity to press its own strategic concerns was rapidly closing. Once
the CTBT was concluded, it would be politically very costly to
conduct nuclear tests. Therefore, the Narashima Rao Government
planned for a nuclear test in December 1995, like France and China,
who first conducted series of nuclear tests and then joined the
142 K. Subrahmanyam, ‘Nuclear Force Design and Minimum Deterrence Strategy
for India,’ in Future Imperilled: India’s Security in the 1990s and Beyond, ed. Bharat Karnad
(New Delhi: Viking, 1994), pp. 176–95.
143 ‘India on NPT,’ official spokesman’s statement, printed in Foreign Affairs Record,
Vol. XLI, No. 6 (June 1995), p. 148.
IND IA ’ S NUCLEARISAT ION PROCESS 231
treaty.144 But before this plan reached its logical conclusion, American
intelligence sources detected Indian preparations andWashington put
enormous pressure on New Delhi to abandon the test.145 Eventually
Americans prevailed over indecisive Indian PrimeMinisterNarashima
Rao. Allegedly, Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) also considered nuclear
testing when it came to power for two weeks in March 1996.146 These
‘near test’ incidents highlighted India’s strategic dilemma—whether
to retain nuclear ambiguity or to unveil it in a rapidly changing global
and regional strategic environment.
1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Although India had been an active proponent of a comprehensive
nuclear test ban treaty since the mid-1950s, it yet finally refused
to sign the treaty when it was readied for signature in 1996.147
Several key factors determined India’s opposition to the treaty. Indians
perceived that the CTBT as it had evolved was an offspring of the
NPT, primarily aimed at preventing countries like India from building
nuclear weapons (because all other non-nuclear states were already
barred from conducting nuclear explosions under the terms of the
NPT).148 India also complained that the nuclear powers failed to link
the CTBT to a ‘time bound framework’ for complete elimination
of nuclear weapons.149 In addition, India was very critical of the
144 Raj Chengappa, ‘Testing Times,’ India Today, 31 December 1995, pp. 49–
50. The Indian Government denied its preparations for a nuclear test at the time.
However, Congress Party sources later disclosed that the Rao Government planned to
conduct a nuclear test on 7December 1995. See, ‘Govt. talks to Cong. on CTBT,’ The
Hindu, 18December 1999. Also, for a detailed discussion on the issue, see VipinGupta
and Frank Pabian, ‘Investigating the Allegations of Indian Nuclear Test Preparations
in the Rajasthan Desert,’ Science and Global Security, No. 6 (1997), pp. 101–88.
145 Tim Weiner, ‘India Suspected of Preparing for A-Bomb Test,’ The New York
Times, 15 December 1995.
146 T.V.R. Senoy, ‘The BJP was ready for tests as far as May 1996,’ Rediff on the Net,
14May 1998, <http//www.rediff.com.>
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CTBT allowing sub-critical tests and computer simulation methods
to upgrade nuclear arsenals of the nuclear powers.150
Additionally, and very critical from India’s standpoint, the treaty
failed to address India’smain strategic concerns—the nuclear arsenals
of China and Pakistan. As the Indian permanent representative to the
UN clearly asserted, if ‘countries around us (China and Pakistan)
continue their nuclear programmes either openly or in a clandestine
manner . . .we cannot permit our option to be constrained or eroded
in any manner . . . ’151 China added fuel to this strategic concern by
conducting a series of nuclear tests before acceding to the CTBT,
which meant that the Chinese had reached such a level of nuclear
technology sophistication that they felt no need to further physical
testing.152
Indeed, the conclusion of the CTBT and subsequently increased
pressure from the major powers to adhere to the treaty acutely
exacerbated India’s strategic anxiety. As a result, India was caught in
a high degree of nuclear dilemma and its ambiguous nuclear posture
was gradually becoming difficult to sustain. It was in such a context
India ultimately advanced an overt nuclear posture.
Pokhran II
TheBJP returned to powerwinning the February–March 1998 general
elections. During the campaign and in its election manifesto, this
Hindu nationalist party promised that it would review the nuclear
policy if it was voted to power.153 Soon after assuming office, the
Vajpayee Government appointed a strategic review committee. Based
on the recommendations of that committee, it carried out five nuclear
tests on 11 and 13 May 1998. According to the Indian Government,
India tested three types of weapon designs on11May: a thermonuclear
150 K. Subrahmanyam, ‘The CTBT Puzzle,’ The Economic Times, 8 June 1996.
151 ‘Statement of Prakash Shah, India’s permanent representative to the United
Nations at the 50th session of the UNGeneral Assembly,’ 9 September 1996, printed
inMinistry of External Affairs,Statements by India onComprehensiveNuclearTest BanTreaty
(CTBT), 1993–1996 (New Delhi: External Publicity Division, Ministry of External
Affairs, Government of India, 1996), p. 139.
152 Sanjay Suri, ‘Chinese Test Seen Behind Indian CTBT Stand,’ India Abroad,
23 August 1996, p. 8.
153 Chapter Eight, ‘Our Nation’s Security,’ Election Manifesto of the BJP 1998,
printed in Agni: Studies in International Strategic Issues Vol. 2, No. 2 (September–
December 1997), pp. 60–6.
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device, a fission device, and a low-yield device. Two additional sub-
kiloton tests were carried out on 13May. In a SuoMoto statement to the
Parliament on 27May, PrimeMinister Vajpayee claimed that the tests
were successful. He also announced a unilateral test moratorium.154
The question has arisen as to why India tested nuclear weapons at
the point that it did? Two explanations are generally advanced in this
regard. Firstly, the tests were inextricably linked to the rise of the
BJP to power.155 And secondly, the BJP conducted the tests to upgrade
domestic political support.156 If not totally wrong, these arguments
are not sufficiently convincing to account for the Pokhran II. True,
the BJP Government conducted the tests; however, the first argument
ignores the fact that the Congress Government attempted to test a
nuclear weapon in December 1995. If the Americans had not detected
Indian preparations and put extreme pressure on Narashima Rao to
abandon the planned test, history would have been that it was the
Congress Party, not the BJP, that had advanced India’s overt nuclear
posture. Therefore, the linkage between BJP’s rise to power and the
nuclear tests is weak.
Many within the BJP might have thought the tests in terms of
upgrading their election fortunes. However, the top BJP leadership
was well aware that there was little that the tests could add in terms
of political support, because BJP’s policy on the nuclear issue was
well-known. As if to vindicate this point, the BJP lost elections in
three states (Hariana, Rajasthan and Delhi) only few months after
conducting the tests.
Indeed, the Pokhran II was prompted by strategic factors. To the
extent India was pushed to the wall on the nuclear issue in the
aftermath of the indefinite extension of the NPT and the conclusion
of the CTBT, sooner or later it had to make a choice. Against the
backdrop of extreme pressure from the major powers to sign the
CTBT, India’s policy of nuclear ambiguity had gradually become
unsustainable in the later half of the 1990s. The choice was either
to accept a non-nuclear status by signing the NPT and the CTBT
or to adopt an open declaratory posture by conducting nuclear test.
154 ‘SuoMoto Statement by PrimeMinister Atal Behari Vajpayee to the Lok Sabha,’
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India chose the latter option. As an Indian newspaper in its editorial
maintained: ‘When history is written, the CTBT will be best remem-
bered for its unintended effect: it pushed India against a diplomatic
wall and forced it to seize the closing window of opportunity to go
nuclear.’157
India’s nuclear policy since the 1960s has been primarily guided
by and responsive to the existence and gradual intensification of a
nuclear security dilemma in the South Asian region. The Pokhran II
was a culmination of this policy process, which occurred in a vulnerable
strategic environment that emerged after the end of the Cold War.
Given this context, it was not surprising that India opted for the
declaratory nuclear deterrence posture when it came to the point of
making a choice. Opposite to this would rather have been surprising
and contrary to its long-standing nuclear policy.
Conclusion: Indian Nuclearisation Process and the Nuclear
Proliferation Debate
Indeed, multiple factors influenced the Indian nuclear development.
During the first phase (1947–1964), a combination of factors—the
motive to use nuclear energy for industrial growth and economic
prosperity, to achieve technological and scientific self-sufficiency,
the aspiration to transform India into a ‘great state’ and Homi
Bhabha’s immense influence on the nuclear programme—influenced
the building of the Indian nuclear infrastructure. In the second
phase (1964–1974), these factors diluted to a considerable extent
due to the rise of the ‘Chinese nuclear threat.’ India responded
to this development by adopting a ‘nuclear option’ strategy, which
eventually culminated with the first nuclear test in 1974 (Pokhran I).
From 1974–1998, in the third phase of its nuclear development,
India persistently upgraded its ‘nuclear option’ capabilities against a
gradually intensifying tripartite nuclear security dilemma (involving
China, India and Pakistan) in the South Asia region. India pursued
a policy of nuclear ambiguity—neither confirming nor denying the
pursuance of a nuclear weapons programme—during this period that
eventually led it down the road to Pokhran II.
Observably, the prestige factor in the context of the aspiration to
transform India into a ‘great state’ might have played a role in the
157 The Hindustan Times, 16 October 1999.
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Indian nuclear decision-making. Also, the IAEA bureaucratic push
factor might have significant influence in determining the course of
the Indian nuclear programme. It should not be surprising if many
would have thought the nuclear programme in terms of domestic
political gains. However, a closer look at the key junctures of India’s
nuclear proliferation decision highlights that critical push to move
towards the nuclear path specifically came from the strategic factors.
A nuclear trajectory in India developed in the context of China’s first
nuclear test in 1964. Before that there is no evidence to suggest
that India ever contemplated an active military nuclear programme.
As China modernised its nuclear arsenal and Pakistan emerged as
a nuclear factor in the 1970s, a tripartite nuclear security dilemma
eventually led India towards the 1998 nuclear tests.
The prestige factor, as noted above, although did play a part, yet
has not been the paramount element of the Indian nuclear decision
making. A careful scrutiny of the nuclearisation process proves that
deeper motives other than prestige and status were involved in India’s
pursuit of a military nuclear programme. It is indeed difficult to
conceive that India has invested such huge resources in a nuclear
programme merely to derive national prestige. India had to build its
nuclear programme against the need to invest resources in social and
economic sectors. The Indian nuclear debate that ensued following
the Chinese nuclear test in 1964 also indicated that economic consi-
deration was one of the arguments that were advanced against India
goingnuclear. In addition,NewDelhiwas aware that amilitary nuclear
programme could cause a deterioration of Sino-Indian relations and
might even lead to a ruinous nuclear arms race. It was a foregone
conclusion, moreover, that any Indian military nuclear programme
would automatically provoke a similar Pakistani venture.158 From a
cost-benefit analysis, it appears unconvincing to argue that India has
built a nuclear arsenal for only gaining prestige.
The technological momentum argument is partially valid, although
in the ultimate analysis it does not provide an adequate explanation for
India going nuclear. At critical junctures, it was not the technological
compulsion that influenced the Indian nuclear decisions. In this
158 During a debate in the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of the Indian Parliament)
on 8 March 1966, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi asserted: ‘If we make
them (nuclear weapons), then Pakistan will necessarily acquire bomb, from some
quarter or the other.’ The original statement was in Hindi. An English version
is produced in R.L.M. Patil, India—Nuclear Weapons and International Politics (Delhi:
National Publishing House, 1969), p. 54.
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context, Indira Gandhi’s decision to initially shelve and subsequently
revive the subterranean nuclear explosive project (SNEP) clearly
disproves the technological momentum argument. Further, if this
argument were all the time valid, India would have conducted nuclear
tests well before 1998 because in technical terms it was ready to
conduct a nuclear weapon test much earlier. Therefore, it is obvious
that the technological momentum was not a critical factor in India’s
nuclear weapons development programme.
The domestic politics argument, although important to understand
the first phase of India’s nuclear development, fails to explain why
India turned its civilian nuclear programme to a military-oriented
project. No doubt, Homi Bhabha was instrumental in laying out an
ambitious nuclear programme in the formative stage of India’s nuclear
development. However, he was not an important factor in India’s
adoption of a ‘nuclear option’ in the aftermath of the first Chinese
nuclear test in 1964.
Many argue that the Pokhran I and II decisions by Indira Gandhi
and Atal Behari Vajpayee respectively were undertaken in order to
score domestic political gains. But a closer assessment reveals that
neither Gandhi nor Vajpayee was motivated by such a consideration.
Pokhran I decision, it should be noted, was taken when Gandhi was at
a peak of domestic popularity following the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War.
In addition, if she did consider a nuclear test for domestic popularity
purpose, the natural action she would have subsequently undertaken
was a second nuclear explosion when her popular support plummeted
in 1976 or before the 1977 general elections. But she did not do
that. It is also intriguing to observe that no other subsequent Indian
Prime Minister before 1998 undertook this approach to upgrade
his/her popularity. The Pokhran II decision, as argued above, was
taken in the context of the strategic pressure that India confronted in
the aftermath of the conclusion of the CTBT. The domestic politics
argument is indeed an insufficient explanation for India’s decision to
go nuclear.
